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The mining industry is a very important sector of the South African national economy. A major 
factor threatening the sustainability of this industry is the worrying effect of mining accidents. 
These accidents usually lead to the destruction of property, injury/death of mine workers, and 
pollution of the environment. Although mining is generally seen as a hazardous operation 
worldwide, the accident rates in South African mines are still unacceptably high. Another 
worrying phenomenon is the fact that since 2003 reduction in fatalities and injuries has been 20–
25% short of annual targets set by stake holders. These factors make the safety of the industry a 
very important subject.  
The understanding of accident causality is a major step in the quest to reduce accidents. It is only 
with a good understanding of the accident process that effective remedies can be designed. 
Accident modelling techniques provide the necessary platform for the interpretation and 
understanding of accidents at workplaces. 
The Swiss Cheese Model of accidents has proven to be a very efficient way of analysing 
industrial accidents. In this model, an accident is seen as a combination of unsafe acts by front 
line operators and latent conditions in the organization. The model helps to identify factors in an 
organizational structure that influence human behaviour/performance at workplaces.  
This study is aimed at demonstrating how a systemic approach can be applied to the analysis of 
the causes of accidents in South African mines.  In this study, an accident analysis framework 
has been developed from the Swiss Cheese Model, combining the Mark III version of the Swiss 
Cheese Model, the Nertney Wheel and safety management principles. The main section of the 
framework is made up of three layers of accident causality: proximal causes, workplace factors 
and systemic factors. The second section (metadata) of the framework incorporates contextual 
data pertaining to each accident such as age, experience, task being performed, and time of 
accident. These data enhance the understanding of accident causality. The third and final section 
of the framework incorporates information about accident causing agencies and the nature of 















In this study, ninety-one accident reports from a platinum mine in South Africa were used to 
populate the developed framework. The results show that while routine violations (45% of all 
incidents analysed) were the most common form of unsafe act, problems in the physical 
environment of workers were the most common workplace factor (39.6% of all accidents 
analysed) and inadequate leadership the most common systemic factor (51.6% of all accidents 
analysed) identified.  
It was also realized that some workplace factors were more commonly associated with particular 
unsafe acts compared to others. For example, while problems in the physical environment were 
the most common workplace factor identified with slips and lapses, a poor behavioural 
environment was the common workplace factor identified with routine violations. The workplace 
factors identified with mistakes were fairly distributed amongst: unsafe work practices, problems 
with competent people and an un-supporting physical environment.  
Other results from this study also reveal that some systemic factors were more associated with 
particular workplace factors than others. For example, while poor behavioural environment was 
usually due to leadership problems, problems in housekeeping, risk management and workplace 
design were the causes of poor physical environment. While problems with hazard identification 
was the common systemic factor identified with existence unsafe work practices, systemic 
factors identified with the absence of fit-for-purpose equipment were issues with maintenance 
management, provision of resources and leadership. The most common systemic factors 
identified with the absence of competent people were problems with training and competence, 
and leadership.  
  The results have been compared with other studies both locally and internationally and 
similarities and differences noted. 
 The outcome of this study is the demonstration that systemic factors rather than human errors 
and violations are the actual causes of accidents in the mining sector. Another benefit of the 
study is the availability of an accident analysis tool that can be further tested across other mining 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The mining industry represents a very important sector of the economy of South Africa. The 
benefits of the mining industry in South Africa can be seen in terms of contribution to 
employment, export earnings, power generation and gross domestic product.  Figure 1 below 
shows that over the past decade mining has contributed in 2010 real rand terms 2 477.9 billion 
ZAR as sales revenue, 1 847 billion ZAR as export earnings, 1 716.1 billion ZAR as gross 
domestic product, 553.8 billion ZAR as employee remuneration and 422.7 billion ZAR as fixed 
investment. These figures show how central mining is to the South African economy. 
 
Figure 1: Contribution of mining to South Africa over the past decade expressed in 2010 
































A major problem facing the South African mining industry is mining related accidents. These 
accidents usually lead to loss of property, injury/death of personnel, and pollution to the 
environment. In the past, mining accidents have led to shut downs and threats of shut downs of 
mines (Ryan, 2008; Mail and Guardian, 2011).  
As at 2007, the country stood the risk of directly losing a significant amount of money if the 
mining industry continued to experience shut downs. Such potential losses included: 120 billion 
ZAR per year amounting to 7% of gross domestic product, 215 billion ZAR per year in foreign 
revenues  (equivalent to about 40% total foreign exchange earnings) and about one million direct 
and indirect jobs (Ryan, 2008). This makes mine safety an important subject in the sustainability 
of the sector. 
Historically, South African mining has been seen as a high risk industry. From 1900 to 1993, 
over 69 000 mine workers died with more than a million seriously injured.  In 1993 alone, 578 
mine workers died in accidents, with 8 532 mine workers seriously injured (Stanton, 2003). 
Although there has been a reduction in the number of mining accident fatalities since 1993, the 
number of deaths per year across mines is still very high. In the years 2002 to 2007 a minimum 
of 200 mining related fatalities were recorded each year. As at 2011, one person dies every three 
days, on average, from mining related accidents (Figure 2). Figures from the South African 
Chamber of Mines show that the coal, platinum and gold mining sectors together contribute to 
over 80% of the fatalities recorded in the mining industry (SA Chamber of Mines, 2012). Since 
2003, reduction in  fatalities and injuries have been  20 – 25% short of annual targets set by stake 
holders at the mine health and safety summit of 2003 (Hermanus, 2007). These statistics show 
the enormity of the challenge surrounding mining safety in South Africa.  
Although mining is generally seen as a hazardous occupation worldwide, the number of fatal and 
non-fatal mining related accidents in South Africa is significantly higher than in countries such 
as Australia, Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States of America (Ural and 
Demirkol, 2008). Human error has been blamed for most of these. Various mining companies 
allude to the fact that they run efficient systems, hence behavioural problems of workers are to 
blame for most accidents.  However, evidence gathered in other countries has shown that human 















aims to elucidate the factors affecting accidents in South African mines through the analysis of 
accident causality at a typical South African mine. 
 
Figure 2: Mining fatalities in South African. (Data Source: SA Chamber of Mines, 2012) 
 
1.2 Analysis of Mine Accident Causality 
The understanding of accident causality is the first and major step in the quest to reduce 
accidents. It is only with a good understanding of the accident process that effective preventive 
measures can be designed. Accident modelling techniques provide the necessary platform for the 
interpretation and understanding of accidents at workplaces. 
Over the years, in accident modelling, there has been a shift from a sequential or event based 
approach to a systems approach. This is because sequential or event based methods cannot 
adequately illustrate the causes of accidents in complex socio-technical (a combination of social 
and technical components) systems. Event based models consider the cause of an accident as the 
result of a chain of discrete events that occur in a particular temporal order over time. Accident 
investigation procedures in event based models focus on the main events leading to the accident, 
and are usually truncated immediately after a proximal cause of the accident is identified. Human 
error, component failures and energy related events are usually identified as the initiating cause 






































cause of 50-90% of all industrial accidents (Kletz, 2001). Solutions following these methods of 
accident investigations usually entail penalizing those involved in the accidents, substituting 
human activities with automation and creating several layers of protection. According to Reason 
(1990, 1997), these kinds of remedies to causes of accidents are seen as treating the symptoms 
instead of the cause of a problem. 
A new approach to accident investigation is to analyse the accident in the context of the system 
in which the accident occurred. In this approach, accident investigation does not end when a 
proximal cause is identified but there is a continued search for other upstream/hidden factors that 
could have prevented the unwanted event. This search leads to the revelation of factors in the 
systems which are responsible for the direct causes of accidents usually ide tified by sequential 
models. 
The Swiss Cheese Model developed by Reason (1990, 1997) is a model used in accident analysis 
under the systemic method. The Swiss Cheese Model has proven to be a very efficient way of 
analysing industrial accidents. In this model, an accident is seen as a combination of unsafe acts 
by front line operators and latent conditions in the organization. The model helps to identify 
factors in an organizational structure that influence human behaviour at workplaces. Techniques 
based on this model have been applied to the petroleum (Reason, 1997), aviation (Li and Harris, 
2006; Li et al, 2008) and railway industries (Baysari et al, 2008) and more recently to the mining 
industry (Patterson and Shappell, 2010; Lenné et al, 2011).  
The number of mining fatalities in South African mines is still very high (see Figure 2 above) 
despite all efforts put in place by stakeholders in the industry to eliminate the occurrence or 
mitigate the effect of accidents (Hermanus, 2007). This makes it reasonable to hypothesize that 
investigation and mitigation methods are not being directed at the root causes of these accidents. 
It is believed that it is only when the root causes of these accidents are identified that appropriate 
mitigation methods can be developed to significantly reduce mining fatalities and injuries. 
In this study, an accident analysis framework has been developed from the Swiss Cheese Model. 
The framework was developed by combining the Mark III version of the Swiss Cheese Model 
(Reason, 1997), the Nertney Wheel (Bullock, 1979) and safety management concepts in 















Africa have been used to populate the framework developed from James Reason‘s Swiss Cheese 
Model.  The results have been compared to other studies both locally and internationally, and 
similarities and differences noted. The study provides an accident analysis tool that can be 
further developed and tested across other mining commodities in the South African mining 
industry. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
This study aims to demonstrate how systems modelling can be applied to the analysis of causes 
of accidents in South African mines. The approach used involves developing an appropriate 
framework for systematically analysing the causes of accidents. The developed framework is 
then applied to accident data obtained from a South African mine in order to establish its 
applicability.   
 The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To develop a framework that can be used for the analysis of the causes of accidents in 
mines.  
2.  To determine the distribution of human error in mining accidents at the specific mine of 
study. 
3.  To determine the effect of personal and situational variables such as age, experience, 
time, status of employee, etc., on the propensity of mine workers to commit unsafe acts, 
in the accident reports analysed. 
4.  To establish the links between upstream factors (workplace and systemic) and unsafe 
acts committed by mine workers, in the accident reports analysed. 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of this research is limited to using a developed framework to analyse accident reports 
from a South African mine. This involves explaining the reasoning behind various sections of the 
framework, as well as presenting examples of how accident reports were coded into the 
framework. The results obtained from this study illustrate the distribution of the various factors 















1.5 Structure of Dissertation 
This section intends to give a brief overview of the entire dissertation. 
 Chapter Two presents a review of appropriate literature on the topic. The major themes covered 
in this chapter include the global nature of mining accidents, human error as major causal factor 
in mining accidents, the concept of human error, accident modelling techniques, the Swiss 
Cheese Model and other accident analysis frameworks, and safety research applying systems 
theory and safety research in South Africa. These topics are aimed at justifying the need for a 
systemic safety research into mining accident causality in South Africa.  
Chapter Three explains the detailed methodology employed in this study. The topics covered 
include the description of the framework developed and used in this study, the source of accident 
reports used in the study, the tools used for data analysis and an example of how the framework 
was used.  
In Chapter Four the results obtained are displayed. The first section characterizes or explains the 
nature of accidents occurring at the mine under study. The second section focuses on the 
distribution of causal factors identified in this study and the links between different levels of 
accident causality as presented by the framework.  
In Chapter Five the results displayed in Chapter Four are discussed forming the basis of the 






















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter appropriate literature concerning the study is reviewed. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the global mining safety problem. This is done by highlighting mining disasters 
across various countries in the past to put into perspective the need for an extensive/ across-
countries literature review. This is followed by an initial review on the causes of mining 
accidents. This is done to help establish the importance of human error and violations in mining 
accident causality.  
The next section is dedicated to explaining the basic concepts and terminologies in human error. 
Accident modelling and its importance in the understanding of accident causality are then 
explained. The main types of accident modelling are discussed to justify why a systems approach 
is better than an event based approach. The discussion of accident modelling techniques leads to 
the explanation of the choice of the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causality.  
The focus of the literature review is then shifted to the description of the Swiss Cheese Model 
and other accident frameworks that have been developed based on this model. This is done to 
facilitate the comparison of results obtained from these other frameworks with the results 
obtained in this study. 
 The last but one section of this chapter discusses results from systemic studies of mining 
accident causality and conclusions that can be drawn from such studies. The chapter ends with a 
review of safety research focused on South African mining. 
 This is done to demonstrate the gap in knowledge which this study aims to fill. 
 
2.1 The Global Picture 
It is a well-known fact that safety is still a big challenge in mining operations. This assertion is 
supported by recent mining disasters such as the Crandall Canyon disaster in United Sates of 
America (August 6, 2007), the Harmony Gold mine deaths in South Africa (June, 2009), the 
Zonguldak mine disaster in Turkey (May, 2010), the Chile mining accident (August 5, 2010), 















more have caused mining to be seen as the most hazardous occupation in the world. Although 
mining employees represent only 1% of the global workforce, they account for about 8% of 
workplace fatalities. Workplace injuries in the mining industry worldwide have also been 
reported to be very high by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2010).  
These problems with mining safety are a global phenomenon which has attracted significant 
international attention. This has precipitated various studies into different aspects of mining 
safety. The next section is a review of literature addressing mining safety research. 
 
2.2 Mining Safety Research 
Blank et al (1996) studied the relationship between technological development and accident rate 
in the Swedish mining industry from 1911 to 1990. The technological stages considered were 
handicraft, mechanization and automation. The results show that while a change in the mode of 
operation in the Swedish industry from handicraft to mechanization resulted in an increase in the 
accident rate, advancement into the use of automation reduced the accident rate. In the era of 
mechanisation, poorly designed human-machine interfaces and inadequate adaptation to newly 
installed machines were identified as factors responsible for the increase in the accident rate. 
Another finding of the study of Blank et al (1996) is that the unemployment rate had an effect on 
how technological development affected the accident rate: An increase in the unemployment rate 
also increased the accident rate. This was adjudged to be due to increase in working time and 
working intensity which accompanies increase in unemployment. Their study shows that the 
implementation of safety in any organisation is a complicated issue, as solving one safety 
problem may create another if not done from a systemic point of view. For instance, since 
technological advancement cannot totally remove the need for humans on a plant, human factors 
should be factored into any decisions made with respect to safety in any organisation.  
Mitchell et al (1998) studied the causes of mining accidents in Australia. They found that 
behavioural problems such as poor work practices are the most prevalent causes of accidents. 
They also identified other factors such as unstable workplace terrain, faulty equipment or 















accidents. The study however did not determine how behavioural problems may have been 
affected by the workplace deficiencies.  
Jacinto and Soares (2008) used the European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW) variables 
to analyse causes and circumstances of occupational accidents in the Portuguese mining and 
quarrying industry. The study identified human error as the most likely cause of accidents 
because the study was aimed at determining the effectiveness of the tool, hence no information 
was presented concerning how and why human error is the most likely cause of accidents. 
Cawley (2003) focused on electrical accidents in mines in the United States of America. The 
study revealed amongst other things the problem of high reaching cranes in electrical accidents. 
His study concluded that although human fallibilities may have been involved in a lot of 
accidents, an engineering solution is a much better option. 
 Kecojevic and Radomsky (2004) analysed the causes and control of loader and truck-related 
fatalities in surface mining operations in the United States.  Mechanical failures, inadequate 
procedures, failure to recognize adverse conditions, failure to respect the loader‘s working area, 
failure to maintain adequate barriers, and failure to adjust to poor weather conditions were 
identified as the main causes of the incidents. Ruff et al (2011) identified operator visibility 
issues, failure to shut equipment down and loss of control as the main causes of equipment 
related issues in United States mines. 
A theme running through most of these previous studies is the ever present human behavioural 
problem in mining accidents. This makes the examination of human behaviour at the workplace 
a very important subject in the quest to achieve a safer mining industry. The next section seeks to 
explain the basic concepts of human behaviour and how it affects safety in a workplace.  
 
2.3 Human Error 
Errors and violations are seen as the two ways in which human behaviour contributes to 
accidents at the workplace. While an error can be defined as the failure of a planned action to 
achieve its intended outcome without the intervention of unforeseeable events (Reason, 1990), a 















Rasmussen (1983) human performance model provides a viable reference for the analysis of 
human behaviour in an organizational setting. In this model human behaviours are classified into 
three groups, namely skill based, rules based and knowledge based behaviours.  
Skill based behaviours are seen as those acts which following a statement of intention take place 
without conscious control. These represent routine activities that are automated and highly 
integrated patterns of behaviour. Errors at this level are due to variability in force, space or time 
coordination.  
 Rule base behaviours are those acts associated with tackling a familiar problem which is 
controlled by stored rules or procedures. These rules may be as a result of previous experience, 
or the actor‘s knowledge base. Errors at this level may be due to a misidentification leading to a 
misapplication of a rule.  
Knowledge based behaviours are acts occurring in an unfamiliar setting which demands the use 
of one‘s analytical skills (observation, identification, goal selection and procedure selection) and 
knowledge base. An error can occur at any stage (observation, identification, goal selection and 
procedure selection) of the decision process. 
Human error can be further grouped into slips and lapses, and mistakes (Reason, 1997). Slips and 
lapses are errors that evolve in the execution of an adequate plan. This leads to a plan not 
achieving its intended outcome. Slips and lapses are related to skill based tasks or behaviours. 
While slips are due to attention failures, lapses are due to memory failures hence the name 
memory lapses (Reason, 1990, 1997; Kletz, 2001). 
 
 Mistakes are said to occur when there is an error in the plan chosen for a particular task. They 
can be seen as an error in judgement or choice. This error can occur at the choice of inference, 
selection of objective or choice of means to achieve it.  Mistakes are related to either rule or 
knowledge based problems and hence can be classified as rule or knowledge based mistakes 
(Reason, 1990; Reason et al, 1998). 
Violations or non-compliance are defined as a deliberate deviation from practices deemed 
necessary by a designer, procedures, managers etc. (Kletz, 2001). Reason et al (1998) further 















corners or taking the path of least effort every time the chance presents itself. Optimising 
violations may be unrelated to the task; they might just be a personal goal of the operator. 
Exceptional violations are situational specific, which happen on occasions where the operator 
sees the violation as the only option to get the job done. 
Dekker (2001) stated that although investigations can easily point out where people went wrong, 
this does not explain much. He suggested that moving human actions back into the flow of 
events of which they were part will help to explain their action.  
 
2.4 Accident Modelling 
The act of describing accidents with respect to the flow of events leading to an incident is known 
as accident modelling. Accident models provide a conceptualisation of the characteristics of the 
accident process by showing the relationship between causes and effects. They explain why 
accidents occur, and are used as techniques for risk assessment during system development, and 
in post hoc accident analysis to study the causes of the occurrence of an accident (Qureshi, 
2008). During accident investigations, accident models impose patterns on the accidents and 
influence both the data collected and the fact rs identified as causative. Since accident models 
influence the factors considered in any accident investigation, they may either act as a filter and 
bias toward considering only certain events and conditions or they may expand activities by 
forcing consideration of factors that are often omitted (Leveson, 2004). The importance of 
accident models in the quest to achieve safety makes the choice of the right model a crucial 
decision. 
Traditionally two main accident modelling techniques have been applied in industry for the 
analysis of accidents. These two techniques are event based/sequential and systemic accident 
modelling. 
Event based modelling conceptualizes accidents as resulting from a chain or sequence of events 
(Leveson, 2004). In this kind of modelling, an accident process is seen as starting from the 
occurrence of an undesirable event (known as the root cause) followed by a sequence of 
subsequent events leading to an accident. The implication is that the accident is the result of a 















repeated. This theory is the underlying principle for accident models such as Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis, and Cause-
Consequence Analysis (Qureshi, 2008). The common root causes of accidents identified by such 
models include human error, component failures and energy build up.  Solutions prescribed by 
some of the above mentioned sequence based methods of accident modelling include substitution 
of human activities with automation and creating several layers of protection. These models may 
work well for relatively simple systems; however, in more complex systems they have been 
proven to be limited in their ability to clearly illustrate the reasons for the occurrence of 
accidents (Levenson, 2004; Qureshi, 2008). 
Systemic accident models on the other hand consider accidents in the context of the system in 
which they occur. Accident models based on systems theory consider accidents as arising from 
the interactions between system components and usually do not specify single causal variables. 
Every production system is seen as the combination of human agents and technical artefacts 
embedded within complex social structures such as organisational goals, policies and culture, as 
well as economic, legal, political and environmental elements (Rasmussen, 1997; Levenson, 
2004; Qureshi, 2008). Accident models developed from this theory do not stop when an 
immediate cause is found, but there is a continuous search for upstream factors that may have 
contributed to the accident. Models such as the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) of James Reason 
(1990), the AcciMap of Jens Rasmussen (1997) and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) of Nancy Leveson (2004) all have systems theory as their underlying 
principle.  
A point of disagreement in systemic accident modelling is exactly what makes up a system of 
production, i.e. what comprises the system boundary? While organizational models (e.g. the 
Swiss Cheese Model) limit their definition of a system boundary to the managerial level of the 
organisation, other systemic based models (e.g. STAMP and AcciMap) expand the definition of 
system boundary to include regulatory authorities and government. While this approach by 
systemic models such as STAMP and AcciMap to broaden the scope of accident causality is 
commendable, Lees (1996) cautioned of the danger of making an accident process so incredibly 
complex that any attempt to understand it becomes very difficult. The Swiss Cheese Model 















ability to combine real time unsafe acts by front line operators with latent conditions in an 
organizational structure. 
 
2.5 The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Investigation 
The Swiss Cheese Model developed by Reason (1990) for accident investigation incorporates the 
basic components of all successful production systems such as decision makers, line 
management, pre-conditions for effective work, production activities and safe-guards against 
known hazards (see Figure 3). Effective production is only achieved when the right decisions are 
taken at each level of the production system. 
 
















The accident process starts when fallible decisions taken at the management level are propagated 
through the various components of the production system (see Figure 4). These decisions create 





An accident is seen as the time when holes in the various safeguards line up for the accident 































The significance of the Swiss Cheese Model is that the accident incubation period precedes the 
occurrence of the accident itself. It starts with the decisions taken by the top management of an 
organization. In the Swiss Cheese Model, human error is seen as a consequence rather than a 
cause. Reason (1990) believes that it is only when the systemic failures involved in an accident 
are tackled that accidents can be prevented. Reason (1997) likens sanctions and punitive actions 
which happen after accidents as treating the symptoms of a disease instead of the cause.   
Since its inception, the Swiss Cheese Model has undergone some changes namely the Mark II 
and Mark III models. The main change has been the reduction of the layers of possible failure 
from 4 to 3 levels in order to pave the way for more specificity at each level (Reason et al, 2006). 
In the Mark III version of the model (see Figure 6), holes in organizational decisions are 
propagated into workplace deficiencies which in turn breed unsafe acts by frontline operators. 
These unsafe acts eventually lead to the creation of holes in existing defences leading to 
accidents (known as the active failure pathway). The model also caters for the possibility where 
organizational or workplace factors lead to accidents (known as latent conditions pathway). 
Figure 5: The accident trajectory (after Reason et al, 2006). 
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Figure 6: The Swiss Cheese Model, Mark III version (after Reason, 1997). 
 
2.6 Human Error Frameworks 
Although the Swiss Cheese Model is generally accepted as being able to depict situations leading 
to accidents in production systems, it has also been seen as lacking the sufficient details for 
practical applications (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). Professor James Reason himself, in a 
publication revisiting the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason et al, 2006) admitted that the model was 
not intended for such details, but a simplification intended to make it easier to understand the 
essential features of an accident in an organization. In an attempt to deal with this deficiency, 
various analysis techniques based on the Swiss Cheese Model have been developed to meet 
specific needs of various industries. Examples of such methods are the Human Factor Analysis 
and Classification System, the Incident Cause and Analysis Model, the Wheel of Misfortune, and 
the Behaviour Safety method, all of which are discussed in the sections which follows.  
 
2.6.1 Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System was developed by Wiegman and Shappell 
(1997, 2001) for the United States military. The analysis framework is based on the Swiss 















model developed by Edwards (as cited by Weigman and Shapell, 2001). The HFACS framework 
is made up of four levels of analysis (Figure 7).  The first level represents the unsafe acts of 
operators. This level shows errors and violations of frontline workers that immediately lead to an 
accident. Within this level, four types of unsafe acts are identified, namely skilled based errors, 
decision errors, perceptual errors, and routine and exceptional violations.  
The second level of the HFACS framework is the precondition for unsafe acts. This level shows 
underlying conditions that lead to the occurrence of unsafe acts in level one. This level comprises 
the following three categories: condition of operators, environmental factors, and personnel 
factors.  
The third level of HFACS framework is unsafe supervision. This level shows places where a 
lapse in supervision or leadership contributes to the occurrence of unsafe acts. Unsafe 
supervision comprises categories such as supervisory violations, failure to correct problems, 
planned inappropriate operations and inadequate supervision.  
The fourth and final level of the HFACS framework is organizational influences. This level 
seeks to identify the role of higher managerial levels in the causes of accidents. Categories in this 
level are resource management, organizati nal climate and organizational processes. The 
HFACS method works on the assumption that higher level factors are the causes of lower level 
factors. The method has been credited with its ability to operationalize the Swiss Cheese Model 
in order for it to be used by investigators in a wide range of industries (Reason et al, 2006).  
The HFACS method was originally used in the analysis of military aviation accidents (Shappell 
and Wiegman, 2001) but has now been used in other industries such as railway (Baysari et al, 
2008), civil aviation (Li and Harris 2006; Li et al 2008), mining (Lenné et al, 2011; Patterson and 
Shappell, 2010) and shipping (Celik and Cebi, 2009). The original HFACS method underwent 
various modifications before being applied in the aforementioned studies. Patterson and Shappell 
(2010) developed a version of the HFACS method known as HFACS-MI for the mining 
industry. The major change in HFACS-MI from the original framework is the inclusion of an 
additional level of accident causality known as outside factors. This is intended to cater for the 
contribution of factors such as regulatory and other external factors to an accident in an 















leadership‖ for it to reflect the effect of all forms of mine leadership on the accident process.   A 
major criticism of the HFACS method is that there is an absence of clear boundaries for higher 
level causal factors (O‘Hare, 2000). For instance a personal readiness problem can also be seen 
as a physical or mental limitation problem. 
 
Figure 7: The HFACS framework (after Weigmann et al, 2005) 
2.6.2. Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM) 
The Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM) is an organizational approach to accident analysis 
based on the Reason (1990, 1997) model of latent and active failure. The ICAM model is based 
on the principle of the acceptance of the inevitability of human error. The ICAM model identifies 






































Figure 8: The ICAM model (from De Landre et al, 2006).  
 
The first level is absence of defences or failed defences. This seeks to identify inadequate or 
absent defences that failed to detect and protect the system against technical and human failures. 
Under the ICAM model the roles of barriers include awareness, detection/warning, control and 
recovery, protection, escape/rescue and hazard identification.  
 
The second level in the ICAM model is individual/team actions. This level seeks to identify the 
errors or violations of frontline operators that led directly to the incident under investigation. 
Examples of such conditions include working conditions, time pressures, tools availability etc. 
 
 The third level of ICAM is task and environmental conditions. This seeks to identify conditions 
that pre-existed before the incident that may have determined the actions of frontline operators or 
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The fourth and final level of the ICAM is organizational factors. This level seeks to identify 
underlying organisational factors that produce the conditions that affect performance in the 
workplace. Examples of factors considered under this level are hardware, training, organisation, 
communication, incompatible goals, procedures, maintenance management, design, risk 
management, management of change, contractor management, organisational culture, regulatory 
influence and organisational learning (De Landre et al, 2006). The ICAM model is used by BHP 
Billiton in the analysis of its mining accidents.   
 
A major problem the author of this current study identified with the ICAM method is the absence 
of categorization under the layer ―individual and team actions‖.  A major theme running through 
Reason‘s (1990, 1997) conceptualization of the accident process is that, although accident causal 
factors seem numerous, these causal factors can be categorized since they share striking 
similarities. For example, all forms of actions of frontline operators can be grouped into slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations. The author of this current study believes that this categorization 
makes it easier for the design of remedies. 
 
2.6.3. Wheel of Misfortune 
The Wheel of Misfortune method was developed by O‘Hare (2000) for the analysis of aviation 
accidents. This method is based on the fact that the performance of members at the lower 
structure of an organization is constrained by that of those at the top echelon of the organization. 
The Wheel of Misfortune model is based on Helmreich‘s concentric spheres and Reason‘s 
(1990) Swiss Cheese Model (cited in O‘Hare, 2000). The framework of this model comprises 
three concentric spheres (Figure 9).  
The innermost sphere represents the action of the individual that directly led to the event. 
Categories under this sphere include information error, deduction error, goal error, strategy error, 















The second sphere of the Wheel of Misfortune model represents any condition that might have 
affected the performance of the operator. These conditions as represented in the wheel of 
misfortune framework are task demands, interface and resources.  
The outermost sphere represents how management policies, philosophy and procedures create 
conditions that may lead to the conditions discussed in the second sphere. These categories are 
also interpreted with respect to recognised and unrecognised hazards (O‘Hare, 2000). The author 
of this current study believes the categories under local actions as too ramified to be of use in any 
practical study.  
 
Figure 9: The Wheel of Misfortune (from O’Hare, 2000). 
 
2.6.4. BeSafe Method 
The BeSafe (Behavioural Safety) method was developed by ergonomists at the British Coal 
industry as a tool for risk analysis and accident prevention. Originally known as the Potential 















a tool to develop accident prevention initiatives. This is achieved by identifying human error 
potential from task analyses and acting upon the identified errors.  
The identification process (see Figure 10) involves the use of tools such as checklists, task 
analyses and questionnaires. Each analysis starts with assessing the environment or location 
where the task is likely to be carried out (environmental audit) and the effect it is likely to have 
on the performance of the task. This is followed by an assessment of the task requirement (job 
assessment) to know the kinds of abilities needed for the job. Finally, information about the 
person assigned to carry out the task is also analysed (person audit) to identify potential strengths 
and weaknesses. The knowledge from these three analyses is used to identify organizational 
factors that are likely to influence the occurrence of possible human errors. Other analyses 
carried out are a procedures and instructions audit (to identify violation inducing potential of 
rules), an ergonomic audit (to identify error inducing potential of work systems) and the 
performance factors checklist (to identify the causes of such error). The BeSafe method is not a 
post-hoc analysis like the earlier methods described. Accident statistics from the organization 
under study are only used as a check in this system as the approach is based on finding errors 






































2.7 Systemic Safety Research 
The methods described in the last section show different ways in which the Reason (1990) model 
can be further developed and applied to various industries. This section reviews previous studies 
that found a link between operator error and systemic factors in mining accidents.  
Laurence (2004) conducted an attitudinal survey across the Australian mining industry. The 
conclusions drawn from the study suggest that management should not continue to produce more 
rules and regulations to cover every aspect of mining. This is because detailed safe work 
procedures will not connect with miners and having more effective rules and regulations is not 
the only answer to a safer workplace. This study seems to imply that miners want a more 
systemic approach to safety problems.  
Paul and Maiti (2008) analysed the sequential interactions between sociotechnical and personal 
factors leading to accidents in mines. They found that a safe work environment was encouraged 
by the presence of social support and negatively impacted by job dissatisfaction and job stress, 
and that negative personality is encouraged by job stress but is discouraged by the presence of 
social support.  
Kecojevic et al (2007) analysed equipment-related fatal accidents in United States mining 
operations. They found out that workers with less than 5 years of appropriate experience were 
involved in 44% of all incidents that occurred. 
Sanmiquel et al (2010) analysed the causes of accidents in the Spanish mining sector. The 
analysis was such that causes were divided into precursors and contributing factors. The study 
also sought to establish how close (with regard to sequence) a causal factor was to the incident. 
The study reported that while environmental problems are the most dominant initiating cause of 
accidents, behavioural problems are usually the final cause of accidents. Environmental events 
were seen to be due to deficiencies in the preventive system of organisations. Skill based errors 
were reported as the most dominant behavioural problem. The study also identified unsafe work 
practice, lack of training and equipment as the main contributory factors to accidents. This study 
revealed why human behaviour is blamed for most accidents in the mines: it is usually the last 
precursor to most incidents. It also confirms Reason‘s (1990) concept of accident pathogen, 















causal. This study however did not construct links between these accident pathogens and the 
behavioural factors. 
Patterson and Shappell (2010) studied human factor trends and system deficiencies within 
mining by analysing Australian mining accidents using the HFACS-MI method. The results 
showed that unsafe acts were involved in almost all incidents. Skill based errors were the most 
pre-dominant unsafe act and did not vary across mine types. Pre-conditions for unsafe acts were 
present in 81.9% of the cases analysed. The environment of mine workers was the most common 
pre-condition for unsafe acts. Unsafe leadership was identified in 36.6% of the cases while 
organizational influences were identified in only 9.6% of the cases. This study represents a much 
more structured organizational analysis of incidents where causal factors at each level of the 
organizational hierarchy were identified. The results seem to show that higher level factors are 
involved in fewer accidents. This may be due to one of two reasons. The first is that it may be 
that a single deficiency in an upper organizational factor has the potential to affect more factors 
beneath it. The second reason is that it may be due to the focus of the accident investigation. 
Most accident investigations are conducted by people occupying high positions in the 
organizational hierarchy, which makes it less apparent for them to focus on their own misdeeds. 
A third reason may be found in the studies of Sanmiquel et al (2010) which found out that 
behavioural problems are usually the final cause of accidents.  This means that, during the time 
of the investigation, earlier causes may have been less apparent.  
The study of Lenné et al (2011) examined the extent of association between high level 
organisational factors and operator performance by analysing mining incidents in Australia using 
the HFACS method. The results showed that skill based errors are the most common causes of 
unsafe acts. The results further showed that while adverse physiological state was the most 
common cause for skill based error, adverse mental state and technological environment (level 2 
factor)  were the most common causes of decision error (level 1 factor), and  team resource 
management (level 2 factor) was the most common cause of violations (level 1 factor). The study 
also showed that while inadequate supervision and planned inappropriate actions (level 3 factors) 
were the causes of most cases of crew resource management (level 2 factors), supervisory 
violations and inadequate supervision were the causes of adverse physiological state and adverse 















(level 4 factors) as the most common causes of inadequate supervision (level 3 factors). The 
essence of this study is the ability to construct linkages between different levels of accident 
causes.  This study demonstrates Reason‘s (1990) theory of accident trajectory in mining 
accidents 
2.8 Safety Research in South Africa 
The results obtained from different studies using different methods supports the view that a 
systemic approach to accident causality is the right approach to tackle mining related safety 
issues. Although the results from the previous studies conducted in other countries are very 
insightful (discussed in Section 2.7), the context in which these studies were conducted is very 
different from that of South Africa and hence may be of limited applicability. Many of the 
profound differences between mining in South Africa and the rest of the world may be viewed 
from the human factors perspective. 
One major difference between mining in South Africa as compared to other mining countries like 
Australia, Canada and the United States of America is that mining in South Africa is less 
mechanized compared to its counterparts in the aforementioned countries and much more labour 
intensive. While the operation of the coal industry in South Africa is similar to what obtains 
elsewhere, the gold and platinum mines in South Africa employ a lot of personnel due to the 
narrow stopes being operated (Willis et al, 2004; CSIR, 2007; Cohen, 2012). Williams (2012) 
reported that, in South African mines, 20 to 30 people work on a 3m by 3m development tunnel 
where only two people would work on the same area in Canada.  
Furthermore, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of South Africa has 
predicted that South African mines will be labour intensive for many years to come (CSIR, 
2007). The Leon Commission (Stanton, 2003) report also highlighted the relative unimportance 
of surface mining in South Africa as compared to underground mines. Surface mining operations 
are usually more mechanized than underground ones. The fact that more people are involved in 
activities in South African mines implies that human factor problems should be more central in 
the quest to achieve safety in the industry. It also speaks of the fact that the people are very close 















Another major difference between the South African mining industry and others around the 
world is the literacy level of its workforce. The Leon Commission of Enquiry (Stanton, 2003) 
reported that the general level of education of mine workers is dismayingly low compared to 
other advanced mining countries and that the absence of a common language makes 
communication in the industry difficult. 
Consequently, one of the major focuses of mining research in South Africa has been on 
investigating the use of various technologies and innovations to solve specific safety challenges 
in the industry. For example, Squelch (2001) and Etienne (2008) explored the possibility of using 
a virtual reality program to enhance training for hazard identification by mine workers in 
underground mining conditions. This may have been prompted by earlier studies of Ashworth 
and Peake (1994) citing poor risk assessment and the absence of effective training methods as 
the main causes of fall of ground accidents. The independent studies proved that virtual reality 
technology has the potential to provide effective training systems that are relevant to the South 
African mining industry.  
Teleka et al (2012) studied the potential of an automated making safe process in underground 
mines in South Africa. This study was in response to the long standing problem of roof falls in 
South African gold, coal and platinum mines. Most of these roof falls have been attributed to 
systemic deficiencies such as the absence of adequate make safe procedures. The study reported 
that the automated process had the potential to reduce roof fall related accidents. 
These researches address specific problems in the mining industry. The knowledge of the fact 
that the mining industry is yet to fully embrace these innovations and human factors issues (due 
to the labour intensive nature of the South African mining industry) makes research focusing on 
human factors very important. The next set of paragraphs present other studies that focused on 
various forms of accident causality. 
Ashworth and Peake (1994) studied the dominant factors affecting safety in the gold and 
platinum mining industries. They reported an even distribution of unsafe acts amongst slips, 
lapses and violations for most accidents, with the exception of rock related accidents. For rock 
related events the most dominant cause was inadequate entry examination. The study also 















of a few mono rail and mono rope accidents. Poor communication and lack of adequate and 
suitable training were identified as playing significant roles in various accidents.  
Moseme et al (2003) studied the causes of accidents on scraper systems in the gold and platinum 
mining industries.  Poor adherence to standards and procedures, lack of/deficient training 
systems, poor hazard identification, poor risk perception and management, and poor supervision 
of safe working practices and procedures were identified as the principal causes of the accidents 
investigated. 
 Maisa and Pienaar (2011) investigated the relationship between work stress, job insecurity, job 
satisfaction and commitment, and safety compliance in a mine. The results showed that work 
stress and job insecurity have an inverse relationship with safety compliance. Job satisfaction 
was a significant predictor of safety compliance. 
These studies show the wide range of factors that influence accident causality in South African 
mines. Some of the direct causes identified include procedural violations and poor risk and 
situational assessment (all forms of human error). Some systemic factors identified include poor 
training and supervision. Although the findings from the above studies are insightful, in that they 
give an idea of the causality of accidents in South African mining, no attempts were made to find 
the relationships between the causal factors identified in the studies.  
To the best knowledge of the author, there has not been any structured study linking human error 
to upstream causal factors of accidents in the South African mining industry. A systemic study of 
mining accident causality in South Africa would be useful for a full appreciation of the dynamics 
of safety issues in the industry. The author of this study believes that it is only with the 
availability of such knowledge that stakeholders would be able to appreciate the effect of 
decisions made on the propensity of mine workers to commit unsafe acts leading to accidents.  
This study involves developing a new systemic accident framework for the analysis of accident 
reports from South African mines. The decision to develop a new framework in spite of existing 
ones and the choice of application on accident data is justified in the next chapter. The next 
















CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology employed in achieving the set objectives. The chapter 
begins with the description the accident framework developed for this study. The framework is 
explained and compared to other previously existing frameworks. This is done to partly justify 
the need to develop a new framework and also to help compare results from this study to results 
from other studies using previously existing frameworks. This is followed by an explanation of 
how the accident reports used in this study were gathered. Background information about the 
mine from which accident reports were obtained and the format of the accident reports are 
provided to give the reader a contextual view. The merits and demerits of the data used are also 
discussed. Section 3.3 explains how the data was captured into the frame ork. In the last but one 
section, a detailed explanation of the analysis of two accident reports is provided to enhance the 
reader‘s understanding of how to use the framework. Finally Section 3.5 explains the various 
data analysis method used. 
 
3.1 The Development of an Accident Analysis Framework 
 
An analysis framework was developed to analyse accident data from a South African mine. The 
aim was to develop a systemic framework which is simple but applicable to accident causality in 
the mining context. The framework, which was developed on a Microsoft 2010 Excel 
spreadsheet, has three major sections, namely: causal analysis, agency and barrier analysis, and 
metadata. The three sections of the framework are described next. 
3.1.1. Causal Analysis  
This section of the framework is responsible for the analysis of accident causality (see Appendix 
C1 to C3). Accident causality is described in a similar manner to the Mark III version of the 
Swiss Cheese Model (see Figure 6). The causal section of this framework is further divided into 
three levels of accident causality, namely proximal causes, workplace factors and systemic 















 3.1.1.1. Proximal causes 
The first level of the causal section of the framework seeks to find the activities that lead directly 
to an accident (see Appendix C1). These are subdivided into unsafe human acts and non-human 
causes. The use of the word ‗unsafe‘ in this context implies any action or activity of an operator 
that directly leads to an accident. It may also be due to the operator‘s actions failing to achieve 
their intended objectives. Unsafe acts are further classified into slip and lapses, mistakes, routine 
violations and exceptional or deviant violations. The choice to stay with this categorization is 
due to the fact that these are terminologies (slips, lapses, mistakes and violations) that are already 
being used in the safety parlance. During the development of the framework, it was deemed not 
necessary to use a less common classification for unsafe acts since, one of the aims of 
developing a new framework was ease of usage. These subdivisions (slips, lapses, mistakes and 
violations) cover all possible ways human behaviour can lead to accidents.  
 Slips and lapses as used in this framework represent all situations in which an adequate plan 
fails to achieve its intended purpose due to a distraction in the original plan. They can also be 
seen as the errors associated with highly routine activities which are carried out in an autopilot 
mode.  While slips are due to loss of concentration, lapses are due to loss of memory. Slips and 
lapses although classified separately by Reason (1990), are combined in the framework 
developed in this study because they both entail the same psychological process which is skilled 
based activities. This is synonymous with skilled based errors in the HFACS and HFACS-MI 
frameworks or action errors in the Wheel of Misfortune framework. 
 Mistake: The term mistake is used in the newly developed framework to describe all situations 
in which a plan carried out proves to be inadequate. Mistakes are due to wrong judgement which 
may further be due to inadequate knowledge or wrong interpretation of a situation. Further 
ramifications such as diagnosis error or procedure error are also used; however, diagnosis error 
as presented in the Wheel of Misfortune taxonomy (O‘Hare, 2000) was deemed not necessary in 
this framework.  Such details were only seen to be necessary if further research was being 
conducted on the various forms of mistake. The author also believes that the nature of most 















Violation or non-compliance are used in this framework to describe situations where there is a 
deliberate attempt not to follow laid down procedure or rules. They are grouped into routine 
violations and exceptional/deviant violations. What distinguishes a violation from a mistake is 
whether or not there was an organizational rule concerning the particular act.   
 Routine violations involve all the times when rules are breached to save time, reduce effort or 
any other reasons. These violations may have been noticed by management which has not taken 
any step to curb them as long as they did not result in an accident. In the mining context, an 
example of a routine violation may be a failure to use the protective equipment specified for a 
particular task or starting a task without a permit to work. 
Deviant violations are out of the blue violations. These are difficult to predict and control. They 
may occur when workers see an act as the only way to get a job done. They may also be due to a 
personal goal of the operator or personnel involved. 
A clear distinction between routine and deviant violations can be judged from the number of 
times they occur.  
Non-human causes: This category was created to accommodate situations in which no human 
error is directly involved in the cause of an accident. Events such as sudden failure of equipment, 
structures, natural disasters etc., are classified under this category. 
 
3.1.1.2 Workplace factors 
This level of the framework addresses conditions at the workplace/work-environment that 
contribute/lead to accidents (see Appendix C2). They may also be described as latent conditions 
that generate what been termed the proximal causes of accidents (section 3.1.1.1 above). The 
factors considered were adopted from the Nertney wheel or the work process model (Bullock, 
1979), which identifies four components necessary for every safe and productive system.  
The identified components are: competent people, safe work practices, fit-for-purpose equipment 



















Figure 11: The Nertney Wheel (Source: New South Wales Government, 2011) 
 
Competent people: The quality of the human resources being used for a particular task is 
essential for its success or otherwise. Operations in hazardous processes such as mining require 
the use of competent people. Competence is defined in relation to the task in question. The 
technical know-how is judged based on whether the personnel were trained for the particular 
task, the training process was adequate for the task in question, and the operator was permitted to 
perform the task in question.  This category describes all situations in which an operator did not 
have the ability to achieve the assigned task. People who have the requisite knowledge but did 
not have the physical or medical fitness to achieve the requisite task are also classified under this 
category. Situations in which there was a lack of numerical strength are also classified under this 
category. The category competent people may be compared to substandard conditions of operator 
in the HFACS. Categories such as personal readiness in HFACS and fitness for duty in HFACS-















framework. This view is influenced by the notion that readiness and fitness affect the 
competence of an operator for a particular task. 
Fit-for-purpose equipment is a necessity for effective production. This category is included in 
the framework to cater for situations in which the quality of equipment being used influenced the 
output of the task or the behaviour of the operators. This includes amongst others: faulty 
equipment, less than adequate equipment, poor designs as well as equipment capacity below the 
task it is being used to perform, and the absence of any other job aid needed. Typical examples 
of the absence of fit-for-purpose equipment include malfunctioning alarms, unavailability of 
PPE, faulty vehicular breaking systems etc. This is analogous to technical environment in the 
HFACS and HFACS-MI frameworks and resources and interface in the Wheel of Misfortune 
framework. 
Unsafe work practices: A safe working system is needed for safe production in any organization. 
This category is included in the framework to cater for all situations where the manner in which 
work is carried out at the workplace exposes workers to hazardous situations.  This includes 
situations in which there is a lack of standards on how a particular task is to be carried out or the 
method described in procedures proves inadequate for safe completion of the task.  
Controlled work environment: This category of the framework describes situations where the 
quality of the working environment affects the performance of mine workers. This category is 
further divided into two, namely: physical and behavioural environments. 
 Physical environment includes but is not limited to situations such as noisy environment, 
inadequate lighting, poor ventilation, slippery floors, unstable roofs, absence of safety symbols 
and poorly demarcated workplace. These situations are known to influence the performance of 
mine workers. This category is similar to physical environment in the HFACS and HFACS-MI 
frameworks and task demands (which the author of the framework explained to be affected by 
the task environment) in the Wheel of Misfortune framework.  
Behavioural environment describes situations in which unsafe behaviours are either condoned or 
not frowned upon. Example of poor behavioural environment is when a worker finds him/herself 
working in a team that does not frown upon flouting of working procedures. Behavioural 















framework or communication and coordination in the HFACS-MI framework (both embody 
poor leadership and poor coordination). Paul and Maiti (2008) also found that safety behaviour is 
improved by the presence of a social support group. 
 
3.1.1.3 Systemic factors 
An underlying theme in the Reason (1990, 1997) model of accident causality is that accidents 
occur because components of the system stopped acting in a safe manner. This layer of the 
framework looks at ways in which the top hierarchy of organizations acts in an unsafe manner 
(Appendix C3). Most of the components under this section are elements of safety management 
systems. Most factors considered here are similar to those discussed by De Landre et al (2006) in 
the ICAM model. 
Training and competence: This category of the framework addresses situations where training 
being offered to a worker does not help him to perform the required task in a safe way. It also 
includes situations when a worker has not been made to undergo all the training necessary before 
being assigned tasks. This is not only limited to task training but also job safety/hazard training. 
The selection of people totally unqualified for tasks assigned to them is also included under this 
category.  
Contractor management: This involves situations where lack of company standards on work 
performed by employees of contractor companies results in unwanted events. This includes 
making sure that employees of contracting companies have received the necessary training on 
tasks they perform and that they adhere to the safety standards of the company. This also 
includes briefing contractors on dangers specific to the site of the company. This category of the 
framework is included to cater for situations in which poor contractor management serves as the 
root cause of an accident. 
Design: This category of the framework represents situations when poor design of either 
equipment or workplace leads either directly to accidents or the existence of physical 
environmental problems. Poor design of workplace can lead to situations such as narrow roads, 















of the workplace factor physical environment. Poor design of equipment includes designs that do 
not take into consideration the natural abilities and limitations of the end user such as confusing 
interfaces, weak signals and injury prone equipment. 
Management of change: Changes that occur in organizations introduce new risks into the 
system. This category covers situations where management‘s inability to appreciate the full risk 
that comes with a new project, equipment, and task, leads to an accident. This category is 
included in the framework to cater for situations in which failure to fully appreciate the risk 
accompanying changes in an organization serves as a root cause for accidents.  
Hazard identification: Controls put in place can only protect workers against hazards for which 
they were designed. This makes the identification of major hazards associated with each task 
important. This category of the framework represents situations in which there were no 
organizational controls for a hazard due to lack of identification.  
Monitoring and auditing: For safe production there must be a system of control in place. These 
control systems must be constantly audited and monitored to ensure that they are being adhered 
to and also sufficient to deal with the ever changing working environment. This category is 
included in the framework to identify situati ns in which lack of monitoring and auditing of 
existing controls leads to accidents  
Maintenance management: This category of the framework covers all situations when poor 
maintenance of equipment and structures leads to accidents. A culture of poor equipment 
maintenance can lead to equipment not being fit for purpose which will also lead to operators 
making mistakes and committing a whole lot of unsafe acts.  This is also a major root cause of 
the existence of equipment which is not fit for purpose. Poor workplace maintenance usually 
leads to situations of unstable roofs, poor sanitation, unmaintained ventilation and illumination 
systems, unmaintained structures etc. This is also seen as a major root cause (aside from poor 
design of the workplace and poor housekeeping) of physical environment problems. These 
conditions affect the performance of mine workers. 
Resource provision: This category covers situations in which failure of management to provide 















failure to wear personal protective equipment have been traced in some accident investigations to 
the management‘s failure to provide the required personal protective equipment at workplaces. 
Strategic planning: Investigations into past accidents have revealed that management is 
frequently confronted with decisions involving conflicting goals (Reason, 1997). Decisions such 
as reduction in the number of workforce, how long a shift should take and all other decisions that 
border on the balance between safety and production, can sometimes lead to conditions that 
create accident liability. This category is not easily identified in accident reports. 
Risk management: This category of the framework represents situations in which the refusal to 
deal properly with an identified risk or to manage a known problem in the organization serve as a 
root cause of an accident. It also includes situations in which the risk management approach was 
deficient in dealing with identified risk.   
Leadership: The effect of leadership in the behavioural patterns in a work place cannot be 
overestimated. Safety climate has been described as the employee‘s perception of how concerned 
leadership is about safety. In an industry like mining where most defences are hinged on the 
willingness of employees to obey the company‘s standards and procedures, the presence of 
visible leadership to serve as an example and to enforce rules is very important. This category is 
included in the framework to cater for situations such as ineffective supervision, failure to 
correct deviant behaviours and any other situation in which actions or inactions of leaders could 
have prevented an incident. 
Housekeeping: The nature of tasks in high risk occupations such as mining is accompanied with 
hazards of varying nature. Some of these hazards such as spills, trip hazards (e.g. ropes and other 
object lying in walkways) and fallen rocks evolve with the task hence proper housekeeping 
procedures are needed to keep the workplace safe. The category is included in the framework to 
cater for situations in which failure by management to enforce good housekeeping policies lead 
either directly lead to an accident or serves as a precursor for an unsafe act. 
Work scheduling: The manner in which an organization schedules its work affects the safety 
compliance of the employees and risks associated with tasks. Situations such as working long 
hours without breaks, continuous night shifts, long shifts (> 8 hours) and overtime increase the 















conducive environmental situations increase the risks faced by workers. This category is 
included in the framework as a systemic factor to cater for situations in which work schedule 
serves as a root cause of an accident. 
Emergency response: An emergency can be defined as a sudden unforeseen crisis which usually 
involves danger. These situations require immediate action to protect people, property and the 
environment. It is the duty of mine management to train workers with regards to what to do in an 
emergency and also provide the right tools to use in such situations. This category is included in 
the framework to cater for situations in which the lack of proper emergency procedures 
exacerbates the effect of an accident. 
 
3.1.1.4 Comparison with other frameworks 
The section discusses how the causal analysis section of the new framework compares to other 
frameworks. The comparisons are made between the newly developed framework and other 
models such as the Human Factors Analysis and Classification Method (HFACS) and the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification Method for Mining Industry (HFACS-MI), the Wheel of 
Misfortune and the Incident Cause and Analysis Model (ICAM).  These frameworks were 
chosen because of their relative popularity.   
The first difference between the new framework and the HFACS method of analysis is the 
number and kind of levels used to identify accident causality. While the new framework 
identifies three levels of accident causality (consistent with the Mark III version of the Swiss 
Cheese Model), the HFACS identifies four (consistent with the Mark I version of the SCM). The 
difference arises from the inclusion of a separate level for the effect of leadership/supervision on 
accidents that is created in the HFACS method (also existent in the Mark I version of the SCM). 
This additional level was however not seen to be necessary in the new framework since in most 
systems the role of leadership is to make sure that systemic structures work, hence it cannot 
always be argued that organizational factors place a constraint on the performance of leadership. 
The new framework is developed based on the view that effective leadership is part of 















proximal causes. The three layers of accident causality used in the new framework are shared 
with both the ICAM and the Wheel of Misfortune frameworks. 
A significant difference between the new framework and the ICAM model is the absence of 
categories under the layer of human error (in the ICAM model). This has already been discussed 
in Section 2.6.2. This also may have been noticed during the discussion of the proximal and 
workplace factors of the new framework: no comparisons were made with the ICAM model due 
to the absence of such categories. The new framework shares categorization of proximal and 
workplace factors with the HFACS and Wheel of Misfortune models. 
 
 
3.1.2 Agency and Barrier Analysis  
The agency and barrier analysis section of the framework was designed to capture information of 
the accident causing agents and the safety barriers broken in each accident (see Appendix B). 
This was done with the belief that information from this section gives more meaning to the 
results obtained from the causal section.  
 Safety barriers 
This section of the framework records the safety barriers that failed during the accident process. 
Safety barriers can be defined as any means (physical or non-physical) instituted to prevent, 
control, or mitigate accidents (Hollnagel, 2008). The need for safety barriers in industry arises 
from the fact that the nature of some industrial activities is such that it is not always possible to 
remove all hazards by design. In such situations the safety of employees is ensured by placing a 
barrier between them and the hazard. This implies that the harm from a hazard only reaches a 
target when there is no safety barrier to prevent it or the barriers put in place were not effective. 
This section of the framework is responsible for analysis of the safety barriers that were breached 
in order for a hazard to reach a target. Knowledge of the nature of barriers broken, and how and 
why they were breached, provides a lot of insight into the causes of accidents. The nature of the 















which will dominate in such industry. The ICAM framework also has a barrier analysis section 
(see Figure 8). 
 
 Accident causing agencies 
This section of the framework records information on the agencies involved in each of the 
accidents analysed. While recording the hazards provides information on the energy causing the 
harm, recording the agencies provides information on the material carrying the energy. The latter 
classification was chosen for the new framework developed in this study to ensure that the output 
of the work was comparable to earlier and future work. The accident classification codes 
employed in Item 12 of the South African Mines Reportable Accidents Statistics System 
(SAMRASS) were used in the categorization of the accidents analysed (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2007). Under Item 12 of the SAMRASS code book, agencies identified include  fall 
of ground, machinery tool and equipment, transport and mining, conveyance accidents, 
electricity, fire, explosives and caving. The nature of the mine being studied and the types of 
accidents prevalent in the mine necessitated slight modifications in the use of agencies which 
will be discussed with the results.  ―Agencies‖ as used in this work is synonymous with the term 
―material agent of contact‖ used in the European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW) 
variables. This classification was employed in the work of Jacinto and Soares (2008).  
3.1.3 Metadata 
In addition to data on barriers and accident causing agencies, the new framework was designed 
to capture specific metadata about the accidents analysed (see Appendix A). Although the studies 
of Patterson and Shappell (2010) incorporated some situational data, metadata has never been 
formally integrated into any of the frameworks based on the Reason (1990, 1997) model. 
Metadata can simply be described as data about data or data describing data. These data were 
chosen to elucidate other factors that may have influenced these accidents. For example, 
knowledge of a particular time in which most specific unsafe acts occur could help in 
understanding why those unsafe acts are occurring. The variables chosen were time of accident, 
day of accident, activity the victim was involved in which resulted in the accident, place of the 















employee), age of victim, relevant work experience of personnel and the last vacation period of 
victim. This information on an individual basis may not be very significant but when used 
together proved very useful. These variables were chosen to synchronize with variables specified 
in the December 2007 code book of South Africa Mines Reportable Accident Statistics System 
(SAMRASS). This is because the accident reports being used for the study were written as 
prescribed by the SAMRASS system. 
 
3.2 Data Gathering 
Data used for this work involved accidents that occurred in a platinum mine in South Africa. 
Data could only be obtained from a single mine due to confidentiality issues surrounding mine 
safety in South Africa. The author is aware that using data from just one mine has the 
disadvantage of limiting the applicability of the results obtained in this study. However, the use 
of data from just one mine is advantageous based on the fact that great deal of contextual 
information accompanying the data was obtained thereby making the analysis relevant. This is 
unlike the use of summarised accident reports from the SAMRASS system where such details 
may be not obtained. The reason for choosing a platinum mine is because of its relative 
importance in terms of safety in the South African mining industry. It is known that the platinum 
mining sector has the second highest annual fatalities and Jansen and Brent (2005) reported that 
the safety situation in the platinum industry is getting worse.  
3.2.1 Background of mine used as case study 
The mine has two production shafts and a process plant and it has since 2011 developed its own 
accident framework by adapting the Swiss Cheese metaphor of Reason (1990) to reflect its safety 
dynamics. Each accident report obtained from the mine has sections containing information 
about the victim such as date of birth, job title and experience, and situational data like time, 
agency and date of incident. In addition, every report has a description of the event, a sketch or a 
photograph of the incident, an immediate and basic cause sections, an analysis section and a 
remedial action section. The reports used were from accidents that occurred from 2010 to 2012.  
Two forms of accident reports were used in this study. While the 2011 and 2012 reports each 















2010 reports did not. A total of 91 accident reports were used in the study. The reports used 
included 1 fatality, 27 serious injuries, 31 Lost Time Injuries and 32 minor injuries. In the 
organization‘s context, a fatality is defined as any incident that results in the death of one or 
more people. A serious incident is defined as any incident that leads to a permanent deformity of 
the victim or renders its victims unable to work for 14 days or more. A Lost Time Injury is 
defined as any incident that renders its victim unable to work for 1 to 13 days. A minor injury is 
any injury that is able to render the victim unable to work for up to one day.  These definitions 




The author spent two weeks on the premises of the mining firm. During the two weeks, the 
author was exposed to the firm‘s operations and safety philosophy. The author had access to the 
firm‘s standards and procedure books to help clarify the causes of the accident analysed.  
Throughout the period of coding, the author was in constant contact with the safety manager of 
the firm to explain the terminology used in the reports.   
Accident data from the reports were coded into the new framework using the form as presented 
in appendices A,B and C. Framework categories (such as mistakes, slips and lapses) were 
identified using the description of events, sketch or photographs, immediate and basic causes, 
analysis and recommendations from the accident reports. Each category in the framework (such 
as mistakes, physical environment etc.) was counted a maximum of one time as a cause of 
accident. This count acted as an indication of the presence or absence of a given category for 
each incident. This was also done to prevent over representation of a single incident. Other 
relevant data about each accident were recorded.  
3.3.1. Coding of direct causes of accidents. 
The classification of the direct causes of accidents was based on information captured under the 
immediate causes section of the accident report. Though the report never categorized accidents 
as mistakes, slips and lapses and violations, the exact unsafe act committed by workers was 















knowledge obtained from organization‘s standards and procedure to determine what kind of 
unsafe act had been committed. The differentiating factor between violations and other unsafe 
acts (mistakes, slips and lapses) was whether or not a rule broken by the victim.  The 
distinguishing factor between routine and deviant violations was the frequency of that particular 
kind of violations. The distinguishing factor between slips and lapses and mistakes was 
intentionality (whether the action proceeded as planned).  
3.3.2. Coding of workplace and systemic factors 
The classification of workplace and systemic factors leading to accidents were obtained from the 
basic causes and the recommendation section of the accident reports analysed. Although the sub-
categories used in the framework were not directly present in the accident report, decisions of 
workplace and systemic factors responsible for the accidents were deduced from information 
such as ―failure by supervisor to conduct planned task observation‖, ―poor housekeeping‖, 
―unlevelled ground‖ etc. available in the reports analysed. 
 
To illustrate the process, two case studies are presented in section 3.4 below. 
3.4 Case Studies 
To clarify the coding process that took place, two accidents that occurred at the mine will be 
used for illustration. 
3.4.1 Example 1: A Fall of ground leading to the death of an employee 
The following paragraph gives an account of the event that occurred: 
The accident occurred on the 6
th
 of February 2012 at around 1:20 pm. A worker was walking 
underground in the north shaft when a fall of ground occurred during the installation of 
hydrabolts. The victim died as a result of being struck by the falling rock on his skull and neck. 
The investigation by the Department of Mineral Resources revealed that the fall was due to a 
geological defect that was not noticed during the pre-shift inspection. The inspection was done 
by an employee of the rock engineering department who was not qualified per company 















engineer to do the inspection. The chief rock engineer ordered an unqualified worker to do the 
inspection because his department was understaffed as a result of the resignation of three 
qualified rock engineers.  
 
During the coding, the unsafe act identified in the above report was the employee who carried 
out a task he was not qualified to do. This act is indicated in the framework (Table C.1) as 
routine violation because the author believes it was not the first time it was happening (this is 
motivated by the knowledge that the rock engineer position has been vacant for a while). The 
workplace factor responsible for such behaviour was the encouragement from his supervisor to 
disobey the standards; this is indicated in the framework as behavioural environment (Table 
C.2). The systemic factors identified included poor leadership commitment to safety (indicated in 
framework as leadership) and inadequate management of the effect of the resignation of three 
qualified rock engineer (indicated on framework as management of change). 
 
3.4.2. Example 2: A Lost Time Injury resulting from a machinery accident 
The following paragraph gives an account of the event that occurred: 
The accident occurred on the 8
th
 of December 2011 at around 10:30 am. A belt attendant was 
struck by a load-haul-dump (LHD) while sitting against the sidewall in roadway. The accident 
led to the injury of the victim.  A belt attendant was attending to an electrical water pump in the 
material decline when he sat down to rest against the side wall. The victim might have fallen 
asleep as he did not see or hear the LHD coming. The internal investigation of the mine 
management revealed that the victim was sitting at a place not approved by the rules. 
Investigations also revealed that the place (cubby) was not properly cleaned and might have 
contributed to the victim sitting there. The investigations also revealed that the victim was 
suffering from a chronic illness which might have led to him falling asleep. 
During the coding of the accident, two unsafe acts categories were identified, namely routine 
violation and slips and lapses (Table C.1). In the framework, the ‗victim sitting at an 















time it was occurring) while ‗not hearing the sound of an oncoming LHD was classified as a slip. 
The workplace factors identified to have contributed to the unsafe acts were physical 
environment and competent people. The dirty cubby (physical environment) might have been the 
reason why he chose to sit by the road side while his chronic illness (affecting his competence) 
might have impaired his ability to hear the oncoming LHD. The systemic factors identified to 
have contributed to the accident were housekeeping and contractor management. Poor 
housekeeping was identified as the reason why the cubby was dirty while poor contractor 
management was identified as the reason why an unfit contractor was being made to work.  
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
This section explains the tools that were used for data analysis and representation in this study. 
The pivot table and chart tools in Microsoft Excel 2010 were used to categorize and summarize 
the data. The filter tool was used to single out sections of the needed information needed.  The 
first group of charts generated from the framework (Figures 12 to 16 in Chapter Four) are 
accident characterization diagrams. These charts represent the different ways in which the nature 
of the accidents analysed can be viewed. Accidents were classified according to the task that the 
victims were performing, the type of employee, the nature of agencies, the job title of victims 
and the nature of barriers broken. Such charts can be used to determine whether specific 
categories of people are more vulnerable to accidents than others. For example, the chart on the 
task being performed during the accident (Figure 12) can give a rough idea of the most accident 
prone tasks.  
The second group of charts generated using the pivot chart tools (Figures 17, 23 and 27 in 
Chapter Four) relate to accident causality. Specific charts generated include the distribution of 
human error, the distribution of workplace factors and the systemic factors identified in the 
accidents analysed. The last group of charts generated (Figures 18 to 22, 24 to 26 and 28 to 32) 
establish links between different kinds of variables. These charts were generated to determine the 
effect the variables have on one another. For example, charts were generated to determine the 
effects of variables such as time on the unsafe acts committed. Charts were also produced to 
portray the link between downstream causal factors and upstream ones, e.g. charts showing the 















To conclude, the various sections of this chapter have demonstrated that verifiable methods have 
been employed in this research. The developed framework has been explained in detail and 
compared to previously existing frameworks such as the HFACS and HFACS-MI, the ICAM 
model and the Wheel of Misfortune. The source of data and how the framework was applied to 
them has also been clearly demonstrated with two examples. The next chapter presents the 
































CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the 91 accident reports described in section 3.2 
above. The first sets of results (Section 4.1) are from the accident characterization process. As 
already explained in Chapter Three, such results are aimed at portraying the nature of the 
activities at the mine under study. This was done because of the belief that the nature of the 
operations on a particular site is closely linked with the causes of accidents on that site. It is also 
believed that this serves as the foundation for the causal analysis results. 
 The second sets of results (Section 4.2) are from the causal analysis of each incident. A 
summary table is first presented alongside highlights of the preliminary findings. This is 
followed by detailed presentation of results on each level of accident causality identified, i.e. 
unsafe acts, workplace factors and systemic factors (Section 4.3 to 4.5). The predominant causal 
factors identified at each level are presented alongside with background information which is not 
apparent from the results. 
Other results presented in this section include the analysis of the metadata data pertaining to each 
incident, looking for the possible effects of variables such as time, age, experience etc. on unsafe 
acts, and identified links between higher and lower level causal factors.  
4.1 Accident Characterization 
This section presents results of characterizing the accidents according to factors such as type of 
task being performed, type of employee involved, nature of agency, job title of victims and type 
of barrier broken.  
4.1.1. Task 
The characterization of accidents according to task (see Figure 12) was done to give an 
indication of the level of sophistication of technology used in the industry (e.g. manual or 
mechanized). This was done in synchrony with codes prescribed by Item 1, Section F of the 
SAMRASS code book. Figure 12 shows that drilling, engineering task, handling of material, and 

















Figure 12: Distribution of accidents according to task being performed.  
 The term drilling as used in this study represents tasks involving the use of hand held drilling 
machines on the job being performed. Drilling tasks were involved in lots of accidents due to the 
numerous hazards associated with drilling such as the possibility of fall of ground and the threat 
of being hurt by equipment. The fact that drilling is usually done on unlevelled ground and in 
confined spacing also makes it an accident prone task.     
The accidents classified under the term engineering task occurred during periods of maintenance, 
assembling, installation and erection of equipment. Engineering task represents a category of 
tasks where workers are very exposed to hazards. 
 Accidents that occurred under the category transportation of people usually involved self-
transport situations (e.g. walking, ascending and descending). The main reason for such 
accidents was the poor environmental conditions existing at the time of the incident. Accidents 
involving material handling tasks occurred in situations such as manual loading/unloading, 
stacking and lifting of items. Cleaning related accidents involved housekeeping task such as 
removing fallen rocks.   Accidents under the task make safe category mostly occurred during 
barring. The term barring is used to describe the act of bringing down hanging and loose rocks 




























involved using a long spanner to hit these rocks. This was done to prevent fall of ground.   The 
category others was used not necessarily for tasks that did not fit any classification but for those 
that had very low frequencies on an individual basis.  
Even a preliminary analysis of the tasks which take place at the mine under study show that a lot 
of human labour is being used; hence the accidents recorded involve a lot of human inputs. This 
is unlike chemical plants and the mining industry in developed countries of the world where 
most activities are either mechanized or automated.  
In their study of the South Africa gold and platinum industries, Ashworth and Peake (1994) also 
identified drilling and engineering works (installation and maintenance) as activities frequently 
leading to accidents. However, while their study identified cleaning, transportation of ore, 
supervisory activities as being involved in a significant number of accidents, the results of the 
present study did not corroborate those findings. This may be due to the fact that their work 
included the gold industry or some changes in the industry that may have happened since that 
time.  
 
4.1.2. Characterization by employee type   
The result of the characterization of accidents according to employee type (Figure 13) shows that 
the percentage of accidents involving contractor employees is very significant. The tasks 
assigned to contractor employees were very similar to those of the company‘s employees.  This 
seems to suggest that every safety strategy that is implemented should have factored into it the 
hazard being introduced by workers from outside the firm. This work however could not 
categorize company employees into casual and permanent workers, as prescribed by the 

















Figure 13: Distribution of accidents according to employee type 
 
4.1.3. Job title 
The characterization of accidents according to job title (see Figure 14) was done to determine the 
groups of workers usually prone to accidents. The comparison of such results with the 
characterization according to task also helps to ascertain whether workers were doing jobs for 
which they were trained. The characterisation according to job title (Figure 14) shows that rock 
drill operators, machinery operators and artisans were most involved in accidents. This is 
consistent with the earlier characterization of accidents according to task (Figure 12), where 
drilling and engineering tasks were the most accident prone tasks. This shows that most tasks 























Figure 14: Distribution of accidents according to job title of victims. (Note: A cheesa is a 
person in charge of charging up mining panels with explosive for daily blasting activities). 
 
4.1.4. Agencies 
To give an indication of the common modes of injury, accidents were characterized according to 
the agencies involved. Figure 15 shows that while hand tools/equipment and fall of ground were 
the most common accident causing agencies, falling material/rolling rock, slipping and falling, 
manual handling of material, track bound equipment and scraper and winches were also 
involved in a significant number of accidents. The next few paragraphs are intended to elucidate 







































Figure 15: Distribution of accidents according to the agency involved 
 
In this study, the category hand tools/equipment represents a slight modification of the 
classification used in the SAMRASS code book which is portable power tools (hand held 
drilling machines).  The modification entails the inclusion of other hand held tools such as pinch 
bars and camlock jacks used by employees in most engineering tasks and activities such as 
barring (bringing down) of loose rocks.  
The category of hand tools/equipment being the most dominant accident causing agency is 
consistent with the fact that drilling and engineering tasks were the most accident prone tasks 
identified when accidents were characterized according to tasks (Figure 12). Most injuries 
involving the use of drilling machines were related to the detachment of the drilling leg, while 
most of the injuries involving pinch bars and camlock jacks involved either pinching or being 
struck by the tool.  
While most fall of ground occurred during drilling and barring down of rock (make safe 

































hoppers) occurred during coupling/uncoupling and re-railing of the equipment. There were no 
instances of accidents occurring as a result of the operation of the track bound equipment. 
Situations in which falling rock strike a victim after coming into contact with the footwall are 
classified as rolling rock. 
Most examples of slipping and falling occurred during self-transport activities such as walking 
and running. There were no situations such as falling from heights. While injuries resulting from 
manual handling of material (metal screens, vent pipes, chain blocks) also coincided with 
material handling task in Figure 12, injuries resulting from scraper and winches were frequently 
installation related incidents. Machinery was used to classify any other machinery which did not 
fall in the previously specified machines (track bound equipment, scraper and winches). The 
conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that, in most of these accidents, workers were 
much too close to the injury causing hazards. 
The results shown in Figure 15 were compared with those of Ashworth and Peake (1994), 
Sanmiquel et al (2010), Kecojevic et al (2007), Cawley (2003) and Lenné et al (2011). Ashworth 
and Peake (1994), who studied causes of accidents in the South African platinum and gold 
industries, also identified fall of ground, track bound equipment, slipping and falling, and 
scraper and winches as frequent causes of accidents. This implies that the profile of accidents in 
the mine used as a case study in this research can be said to be a reasonably good representation 
of the accident profile of the South African platinum industry.  
Sanmiquel et al (2010), whose study was based on Spanish mines, reported that most of the 
underground accidents reported were caused by falling and collapsing objects followed by 
victims being trapped between objects. These incidents are very similar to fall of ground, falling 
material or rolling rock identified in this study as some of the most common agencies. Kecojevic 
et al (2007) reported that annual mine fatalities attributable to mine equipment (e.g. haul trucks, 
belt conveyors, front-end loaders, and miscellaneous equipment) in the United States ranged 
from 37% to 88%. This may be due to the fact that mining in the United States is more 
mechanized. Cawley (2003) reported that electrical related accidents represent the fourth highest 
cause of mining accidents in the United States. Lenné et al (2011) reported that operations 
involving surface mobile equipment, working at heights and electrical operations were the 















study nor that of Ashworth and Peake (1994) (which are both based in South Africa) identified 
electrical accidents as a significant cause of accidents in South African mines. These differences 
in the types of agencies dominating accidents highlights fundamental differences  in safety 
concerns between the mining industry in South Africa and in more developed countries. While 
key safety concerns in the aforementioned countries may be how to deal with residual hazards 
associated with a high level of mechanization of mining activities, the South African mining 
industry is still faced with the challenge of removing well known hazards (e.g. fall of ground) 
which have existed in its operations for a long period.  
 
4.1.5. Broken Barriers 
This section analyses the results obtained from the characterization of accidents according to the 
barriers broken; this gives an indication of the nature and efficacy of safeguards designed by the 
mine to mitigate the effect of hazards. From Figure 16, the most breached safety barriers are 
supervision, standards and procedures and risk assessments. This illustrates the fact that existing 
controls (like supervision) which are put in place so as to ensure that workers obey standards and 
procedures are not very effective. It further shows that most barriers used for the prevention of 
accidents are administrative in nature (e.g. rules, supervision, job safety analysis) rather than 
mechanised (alarms, barricades, interlocks, etc). Most incidents analysed involve the breaching 
















Figure 16: Distribution of accidents according to the nature barriers broken 
 
4.2 Causal Analysis 
This section serves as an introduction to the causal factors identified in this study. It starts with a 
summary of the results (Table 1) followed by appropriate comparisons with other studies. 
Unsafe acts were identified in 98.9% (90 out of the 91) of the accident reports analysed. This 
comes as a no surprise since the mine is so labour intensive. The most common form of unsafe 
acts identified are routine violations (identified in 45% of all cases) followed closely by mistakes 
(43% of all accidents analysed) and then slips and lapses (30.8% of all accidents analysed). 
Workplace and systemic factors were implicated in 97.8% of cases analysed. The most prevalent 
workplace factor identified is the physical environment (39.6% of all accidents analysed), closely 
followed by the behavioural environment (34.1% of all accidents analysed). Unsafe work 
practices, fit-for-purpose equipment and competent people were also identified in this study as 



































Table 1: Accident causes by framework categories from the analysis of 91 accident reports. 
Framework Category Frequency Percentage 
Systemic Factors 
 Management of Change 11 12.1 
Leadership 47 51.6 
 
Training and competence 7 7.7 
Contractor management 8 8.8 
Risk Management 9 9.9 
Housekeeping 9 9.9 
Design 8 8.8 
Maintenance management 7 7.7 
Hazard identification 18 19.8 
Monitoring and auditing 5 5.5 
Strategic decision 0 0.0 
Work Scheduling 4 4.4 
Emergency response 0 0.0 
Workplace Factors 
 Competent People 18 19.8 
Fit For Purpose equipment 16 17.6 
 Physical environment 36 39.6 
 Behavioural environment 31 34.1 
 Unsafe work practices 14 15.4 
Direct Causes 
Slips and Lapses 29 30.8 
Mistakes 39 43.0 
Routine violation 41 45.0 















The identification of the physical environment as a major contributory factor was not a surprise 
due to the harsh working conditions underground. This is similar to results obtained by Lenné et 
al (2011) and Patterson and Shappell (2010), from the analysis of different accident reports from 
Australian mines, and Sanmiquel et al (2010) for Spanish mines. In the case of Lenné et al 
(2011) and Patterson and Shappell (2010), physical environment was involved in 55% and 39% 
respectively of all accidents, while in the case of Sanmiquel et al (2010) physical environment 
was involved in about 58% of all accidents.  
Table 1 shows that leadership was the most common systemic factor identified in this study. 
Other systemic factors identified in this study as significantly leading to accidents at the mine are 
hazard identification, maintenance management and management of change. Factors such as 
emergency response and strategic decision were not identified in this study as contributing to 
any of the accidents analysed.   
The involvement of systemic factors in this study was higher than the studies of Lenné et al 
(2011) and Patterson and Shappell (2010), both of which concerned the Australian underground 
and surface mines. This is partly due to the fact that in the HFACS framework used by Lenné et 
al (2011) and Patterson and Shappell (2010), leadership, which is the most prevalent 
organizational factor identified in this study, is a separate level in the HFACS system.  
The percentage of causal factors in Table 1 in each level of the causal section of the framework 
(i.e. direct causes, workplace and systemic factors) does not add up to 100%, because in most 
cases, two or more factors were identified under the same level of the framework as contributing 
to the same accident. For example, a worker not wearing the right personal protective equipment 
(reported as a routine violation) might also have made a wrong judgement (reported as mistakes) 



















4.3. Unsafe acts 
In this section, the unsafe acts identified in this study are analysed in a more detailed manner. 
The section starts by giving examples of specific unsafe acts identified under the broad 
categories (slips and lapses, mistakes and violations) of the framework. This is then followed by 
an analysis of the unsafe acts distribution according to factors such as agencies, type of 
employee, age, experience and time of day.  
4.3.1 Distribution of unsafe acts 
As stated earlier, this study identified unsafe acts in almost all the accidents analysed. Figure 17 
shows the overall distribution of the unsafe acts identified. 
 
 
Figure 17: Overall distribution of unsafe acts 
As can be seen from Figure 17, violations (routine and exceptional/deviant) constitute the most 
common unsafe acts, followed by mistakes and then slips and lapses. The most common 
violations included the following: non-usage of PPE, failure to conduct pre and mid-shift 
barring, use of wrong tools, failure to conduct risk assessment on tasks and working (usually 
coupling and decoupling) on moving machinery.  
























The most common mistakes recorded were inadequate risk/situational assessment and inadequate 
communication. Inadequate risk assessment usually led to situations in which miners took the 
wrong position for a task, used equipment below its capacity and or made decisions that exposed 
them to hazards. Since miners work in environments which are not always predictable, their 
ability to discern when conditions are safe and when they are not is very critical to safe 
operation.  
Slips and Lapses had the least occurrence when compared to violations and mistakes. The most 
common cases of slips and lapses recorded were lack of alertness and not being able to avoid 
hazards because of not seeing them. The occurrence of these slips was not surprising due to the 
extreme conditions to which workers were being exposed and the length of time worked during 
shifts. 
 
4.3.2 Distribution of unsafe acts according to agencies 
This section analyses the distribution of unsafe acts across the different accident agencies (see 
Figure 15). This information could help in developing specific strategies for particular types of 
accident causing agencies. For example, if a particular type of violation leading to fall of ground 
is understood, measures can be put in place to address it. This approach is better than using a 
















Figure 18: Distribution of unsafe acts across different agencies  
 
At a glance what can be seen from the graph (Figure 18) is that different kinds of human errors 
contribute differently in each of the agencies. A face value lesson that can be learned is that a 
single solution to address all kinds of accidents will not work. A deeper analysis of the unsafe 
acts associated with these agencies is therefore needed. 
Fall of ground accidents are prevented in the mine by the barring down of loose rocks and the 
installation of safety nets. Failures to obey these rules were the most common types of violations 
identified in this study as leading to instances of fall of ground. Another prevalent violation 
under this agency is the use of wrong equipment for barring. Inadequate barring activities were 
the most common mistakes leading to fall of ground. Inadequate risk assessment on how safe it 
is to stand during a barring activity is a common mistake identified with fall of ground. In this 
study the most common slips and lapses identified occurred under situations in which a worker 
unknowingly stood under an unstable roof due to lack of warning. 
While the most common violation leading to accidents involving machinery was standing at 




































the path of machinery. Most violations identified in accidents involving scraper and winches 
include working on equipment in motion, the use of wrong tools and the non-usage of personal 
protective equipment. 
While the main violations identified in accidents involving manual handling of materials are 
non-usage of personal protective equipment and improper lifting techniques, the main mistake 
identified was failure to communicate. Loss of concentration is the most common example of 
slips and lapses identified with manual handling of material accidents. 
Most slipping and falling accidents occurred as operators were walking, escaping another hazard 
or performing a task (hence these acts are classified under slips and lapses). During such 
situations, the victims became vulnerable to the presence of trip hazards in their paths. 
Inadequate risk assessments also lead to workers either choosing to stand at trip hazards which 
also lead to incidents involving slipping and falling (hence classified as mistakes). Violations 
usually had an exacerbating effect on slips rather than being the cause: an example is not wearing 
PPE which increased the gravity of injuries occurring from slipping rather than causing them. 
The manual nature of tasks performed by operators implies the use of hand tools and equipment 
such as crowbars, drilling machines, etc. While the most common mistakes associated with hand 
tool/equipment handling are poor positioning and failure to ensure that tools were fit before use, 
the most frequent violations included the use of wrong tools, operating tools without 
authorizations and not following procedures for using tools. Situations in which slips and lapses 
were involved included inadvertently holding the cutting part of a tool and not having an 
adequate grip on a tool.  
Accidents resulting from falling materials/rolling of rocks were caused by violations such as 
non-usage of personal protective equipment and use of wrong equipment. Poor risk assessment 
was the most common mistake leading to the leaving of materials in positions where they were 
likely to fall. 
As stated earlier, all incidents involving track bound equipment occured either during re-railing 
or coupling and uncoupling. The main violation identified under this agency is working on trucks 
in motion. Failed communication and inadequate risk assessment (wrong positioning) were 















4.3.3 Distribution of unsafe acts according to type of employee 
Figure 13 showed that a significant number of incidents involved employees of contractor 
companies; the analysis under this section (Figure 19) to investigate the difference in the 
distribution of the unsafe acts committed by company employees and contractor employees.  
 
Figure 19: Distribution of unsafe acts across the different type of employees 
 
The results presented in Figure 19 show that while violations are the dominant form of unsafe 
acts of employees, mistakes are the most unsafe acts of contractors. These results support the 
assertion that different approaches may have to be used when addressing unsafe acts by 
employees and contractors. The results seem to suggest that organizations may have to focus on 
the level of competence of the personnel of contractor companies assigned to tasks.  
4.3.4 Effects of age and level of experience on unsafe acts 
The analysis in this section seeks to determine the effect of operator variables such as age and 
experience on unsafe acts. Figure 20 shows that both mistakes and violations reduced with 


































Figure 20: The distribution of unsafe acts according to work experience of perpetrators. 
 
Slips and lapses also showed a generic decrease with experience. Although there was a slight 
increase from 0-4 years to 5-9 years, it was followed by subsequent decreases for workers with 
experience 10-14 years and those with experience 15 years and more.  Figure 20 also shows that 
people with less than 4 years of experience were involved in more unsafe acts. Similar results 
were found by Kecojevic et al (2007) when they conducted a study on machinery accidents in 
United States mining industry. Their study showed that personnel with less than 5 years‘ 
experience are involved in most machinery accidents. Sanmiquel et al (2010) also reported in his 
study of mining accidents in Spain that over 42.5% of the accident victims had experience of less 
than 4 years. These results seem to suggest that workers with little experience are much prone to 
unsafe acts as compared to more experienced ones. This may be due to the competence that one 
gains with maturity. However, the author of this study is aware of the fact that the relatively low 
number of unsafe acts identified amongst workers with higher work experience may also be due 
to the fact that as a worker gains more experience at the workplace, there is usually a change in 
role that moves the worker further away from hazardous tasks.    
The distribution of unsafe acts with age (Figure 21) shows an increase in all unsafe acts from age 

































unsafe acts up to age bracket 50+. The graph seems to suggest that employees in the 31 to 40 age 
bracket are the most liable to various forms of errors. Another interesting observation is that 
while mistakes are the most dominant unsafe acts for the lower age groups (21 to 30 and 31 to 
40), violations are the most dominant unsafe act for the higher age groups (41 to 50 and above 
50). This seems to suggest that while younger workers have problems with decisions, older 
workers have problems with compliance. The study of Sanmiquel et al (2010) also recorded that 
those involved in 26.9% of accidents are between the ages 30 to 39 while those involved in 
26.4% of accidents were between the ages 45 to 54. This seems to suggest that workers within 
the ages of 31 to 40 (approximately 30 to 39 in Sanmiquel et al work) are most vulnerable to 
accidents. The author of this study is not ignorant of the possibility that this unsafe act-age 
profile could also be due to the fact that the workplaces used as case study may just have higher 
numbers of workers within that age group, hence this observation can only be put in the right 
perspective knowing the age distribution of the workforce. 
 








































4.3.5 The distribution of unsafe acts according to time of day 
The distribution of unsafe acts across different times of the day was generated to investigate the 
possibility of the existence of higher error liability at particular times of the day. The timing of 
the day was divided into 8 groups (see Figure 22) of 3 hours each. One time zone, 15:00 to 17:59 
did not appear on the chart due to its zero frequency of unsafe acts. This is because that period 
usually did not have any activity taking place. The timing was arranged to synchronize with the 
shifts run by the company used in the study. The latter operates two main production shifts 
namely the morning and night shifts.  The morning shift is from 6  am to 3 pm while the night 
shift from 10 pm to 5 am.  There are occasional afternoon maintenance shifts. 
 
 
Figure 22: The distribution of unsafe acts according to the time of day. 
 
The analysis of the effect of time of day on the propensity to commit unsafe acts proceeds by 
comparing what happens in the morning shift to what happens in the night shifts.  A snap shot 
view of  Figure 22 shows that far more unsafe acts occur in the morning shift (from 6:00 to 


























































































work is done in the morning shift. The time range with very low unsafe acts (15:00 to 20:59) 
represents the occasional maintenance afternoon shifts.  
A focus on the morning shift indicates that while slips and lapses increase with the progression 
of work, mistakes and violations are highest in the middle hours of the shift (9:00 to 11:59). A 
possible explanation is that different psychological processes contribute to each unsafe act. Slips 
and lapses as explained earlier are caused by attention or memory failure. Workers are more 
vulnerable to this error because they get tired as time progresses within the shift. Mistakes are 
caused by error in judgement, while violations are caused by deliberate decisions not to comply. 
The author of this study believes that the trend observed for mistakes and violations is influenced 
by the involvement of supervisors or leaders. This is because inspection a d task observations 
which are done by supervisors and leaders usually occur at the beginning and end of shifts, hence 
mistakes and violations may increase in mid-shift. Also a common example of violation 
identified in this study was failure to perform mid shift barring. This may also be a reason for 
the high levels of violations recorded from 9:00 to 11:59 (i.e. mid-shift).  
The night shift showed very little variation in violations but a reduction in slips and lapses as the 
shift progressed.  
 
4.4. Workplace Factors 
This section explores the workplace factors that contributed to the unsafe acts shown earlier 
(Figure 17), or exacerbated their effects. This is done mostly by providing background 
information on the workplace factors identified in this study. As demonstrated by Table 1 and 
Figure 23, the physical environment was the most common workplace factor identified in this 
study as contributing to accidents. The most common examples of physical environment 
identified in this study include unstable geological conditions, poor illumination, confined space, 
and presence of trip hazards (obstructions, unlevelled grounds, wiring, and slippery floors).  
The behavioural environment was the second most common workplace factor identified in this 
study as contributing to accidents (Figure 23 and Table 1). Most occurring situations of 
behavioural environment include failure to correct violation of rules, absence of supervision, 















purpose-equipment, competent people and safe work practices were in the minority compared to 
the first two categories. Instances of fit-for- purpose equipment identified in this study include 
the absence of required tools, tools having incomplete components (e.g. tools without handles 
and pumps without valves) and malfunctioning equipment.  Instances of competent people 
identified in this study include situations where training received did not adequately prepare 
workers for the tasks they perform, people yet to undergo on the job training and absence of 
training for a particular job. 
 
 
Figure 23: The overall distribution of workplace factors.  
 
4.4.1. Workplace factors leading to unsafe acts 
This section aims to establish links between workplace factors and specific unsafe acts. This is 
motivated by Reason‘s (1990) explanation of an unsafe act as being a symptom rather than the 
actual problem to be dealt with. This analysis, the author believes, will enable managers of 






























4.4.1.1. Workplace factors leading to violations 
From Figure 24, it can be seen that the most common workplace factor identified with violations 
is behavioural environment. This means that most violations occurred because of the absence of 
a system that frowns upon violations by workers and different levels of leadership. Other 
workplace factors such as physical environment, fit-for-purpose equipment and unsafe work 
practices were barely identified as reasons for the violation of company‘s standards and 
procedures.  
These results are similar to findings reported by Lenné et al (2011) where violations had a high 
association with crew resource management (i.e. lack of teamwork, failure of leadership and also 
how the social environment of the worker is managed). Further, on behavioural environment, 
Paul and Maiti (2008) reported that the presence of social support (from co-workers and 
leadership) reduces the possibility of workers having a negative attitude. These results illustrate 
the need for creating a work environment which does not support violations. The survey 
conducted by Laurence (2004) on the Australian mining industry clearly stated that writing more 
regulations is not a remedy for the problems on non-compliance.  Masia and Pienaar (2011) also 
reported job insecurity and job stress as other factors which have an effect on the level of 
compliance of mine workers in South Africa to safety requirements. However, the author could 
not verify such claims since the accident reports used in the study were not designed to 

















Figure 24: Workplace factors responsible for violations. 
 
4.4.1.2. Workplace factors leading to mistakes 
Figure 25 shows that the workplace factors identified with mistakes are much more diversified. 
While competent people and unsafe work practices were the two leading workplace factors, fit-
for-purpose equipment, physical and behavioural environment are also significant. 
 
































































Most cases of competent people identified with mistakes in this study included lack of 
experience, inadequate skill level, not undergoing planned task observation and inadequate 
personnel. There situations obviously made mine workers vulnerable to committing mistakes.   
Most instances of unsafe work practices identified with mistakes in this study included non-
existence of standards for a specific task, and situations in which standards did not fully cover 
tasks. Such situations made workers vulnerable to mistakes.  Most instances of non-existence of 
standards for a particular task (classified under unsafe work practices) identified in this study 
were accompanied by existing training procedures being inadequate to provide the needed 
competency (classified under competent people).  
Confined spacing, poor illumination and ground conditions were the most common examples of 
physical environment identified with mistakes. These conditions usually exacerbated the effect of 
the mistakes rather than being the actual cause. 
The presence of tools with capacity below the task requirement (short pinch bars), equipment not 
functioning properly, the absence of the needed tool and an incomplete set of equipment are 
specific examples of instances of fit-for-purpose equipment identified with mistakes in this 
study. In most cases, the absence of a fit-f r-purpose equipment was enough to result in a 
mistake. Behavioural environment was cited in situations where uncoordinated activities and 
lack of communication led to mistakes.  
Comparing this to the work of Lenné et al (2011), decision errors (synonymous to mistakes in 
this study) had significant causal relationships with technological environment (tools, equipment 
and rules) and adverse mental state (competence of the operator). 
4.4.1.3. Workplace factors: Slips and lapses 
From Figure 26, physical environment was the most common workplace factor identified with 
slips and lapses. The existence of the environmental conditions explained in Section 4.4 make 
victims liable to such slips and lapses. This result differs from those reported in the study of 
Lenné et al (2011) who found out that adverse physiological states (synonymous to health 
problems) had significant causal relationships with skill based errors (synonymous to slips and 















problems) as far as the tendency to cause slips and lapses is concerned. This was because the 
accident reports were not structured to capture those details. There was only a single situation 
where the health of a worker led to a slip. Situations such as modifications in equipment and 
equipment without handles are examples of the few occasions fit-for-purpose equipment led to 
slips and lapses. The results suggest that efforts need to be concentrated on the physical work 
environment if slips and lapses are to be reduced. 
 
Figure 26: Workplace factors responsible for instances of Slips and Lapses 
 
4.5 Systemic factors 
This section takes a look at the systemic factors involved in various accidents. In this study, these 
systemic factors are considered to be the root cause of these accidents. Figure 27 shows the 







































Figure 27: The overall distribution of systemic factors 
 
The results (Figure 27) show that leadership was the most common systemic factor identified in 
this study as contributing to accidents. This is due to the already stated fact that most safety 
barriers put in place were not self-enforcing. Examples of poor leadership included inadequate 
supervision, the failure to train workers (conducting planned task observation), the failure to 
solve known problems and the failure to correct deviant behaviour. 
Hazard identification is the second most common systemic factor identified in this study as 
contributing to accidents. This is said to occur when an accident happens even though the 
accidents victims followed company procedures. This was seen to be as a result of a deficiency 
in the hazard identification process during the formulation of the procedures.  
Management of change, training and competence, contractor management, risk management and 

































Specific examples of management of change include instances in which loss of qualified 
employees (either due to resignation or leave) and changes in task environment or task 
requirements) were not managed properly, leading to accidents.  
Examples of training and competence were situations in which the training provided did not 
cover specific tasks, or untrained personnel assigned tasks.  
Contractor management was cited in situations in which incompetent contractors were found 
performing tasks and in situations in which contractors were made to work without supervision.  
Examples of risk management cited in this study included not dealing with known risk such as 
reported unsafe workplace, reported malfunctioning of equipment, and equipment shortage; and 
not ensuring the safety of the workplace before commencing tasks. Most instances of design 
included conditions such as narrow stopes (openings made in the extraction of ore) and improper 
equipment design.  
The author believes that effective leadership could have been a solution to most of the other 
systemic factors identified such as housekeeping, risk management, some aspects of training and 
even provision of resources.  
 
4.5.1. Systemic and workplace factors analysis 
This section is aimed at establishing the link between systemic factors and workplace factors. 
This is usually done by explaining how the systemic factors may lead to the workplace factors. 
The author believes this would help in the strategic correction of workplace factors, in 
consonance with Reason‘s (1997) description of the Swiss Cheese Model which states that 
workplace factors are created by organizational or systemic factors. 
 
4.5.1.1. Systemic factors identified physical environment problems 
The results (Figure 28) show that the systemic factors that lead to physical environment problems 















the construction of the workplace, poor housekeeping, risk management, maintenance 
management and change management occur during day-to-day mining operations. While factors 
design and hazard identification usually created permanent conditions such as narrow stopes, 
factors such as poor housekeeping, risk management, maintenance management and 
management of change degrade an originally suitable working environment. Both of these make 
it difficult for workers to carry out tasks efficiently.   This scenario depicts Reason‘s (1990) 
explanation of the varying nature of holes in various organizational structures that lead to 
accidents. While the first group of holes (design and hazard identification) lie dormant in the 
organization for a long time, the second group of holes (housekeeping, risk management and 
maintenance management problems) are usually created as production activities are carried out. 
This also confirms Reason‘s (1997) description of safety as not being something an organization 
has but what it does.  
Examples of leadership identified in this study as a cause of situations of physical environment 
included the failure to correct known problems at the workplace and the failure to enforce 

















Figure 28: Systemic factors responsible for instances of physical environment problems 
 
 
4.5.1.2. Systemic factors identified with behavioural environment problems 
This section is aimed at elucidating the systemic factors identified in this study as leading to 
behavioural environment problems. The results (Figure 29) show that leadership is the most 
common systemic factor identified with behavioural environment. Poor leadership was identified 
at different levels, from section manager, shift boss, technical heads to team leaders. This shows 
signs of a problem of safety culture. The author believes the failure of these leaders to correct 
violations is the main reason for behavioural environment. 
 Situations such as change management and work scheduling were identified as causes of poor 
leadership in some instances. A specific example in this study is when unqualified people were 
assigned tasks by sectional leadership due to an exodus of qualified people. This poor leadership 

































occurring in the system. A specific example of how work scheduling led to poor leadership is 
when the lack of adequate number of personnel on a voluntary shift led to inadequate 
supervision. Monitoring and auditing and contractor management were other systemic factors 
that led to instances of behavioural environment.  
 
 
Figure 29: Systemic factors responsible for instances of behavioural environment problems 
 
4.5.1.3. Systemic factors identified competent people problems 
This section elucidates systemic factors identified as causes of competent people problems in this 
study. The results (Figure 30) show that training and competence and leadership were the most 
common systemic factors identified with instances of competent people. Common such situations 
classified under training and competence included inadequate training and the absence of 
training for particular tasks. These situations, in the opinion of the author made workers 






































Figure 30: Systemic factors identified with instances of competent people problems 
 
Examples of leadership lapses that identified with the absence of competent people included 
failure to conduct planned task observation and failure to supervise inexperienced workers. This 
was usually identified as leading to accidents involving inexperienced workers.   
Other common systemic factors identified with competent people are contractor management 
and management of change. While incompetent contractors performing task was the main way 
contractor management lead to competent people, common examples of management of change 
included the effect of worker‘s official leave on the conducting of training of workers. 
 Monitoring and auditing, work scheduling and hazard identification were less common systemic 
factors identified as leading to competent people. An example of monitoring and auditing found 
in this study was the situation where shift leaders not providing adequate training to workers was 
not identified till it leads to an accident. This is seen as an indication of a poor monitoring 











































workforce on voluntary shifts. This in the author‘s opinion reduced the workers ability 
(competence) to execute the task assigned to them. An example of hazard identification 
identified in this study is when workers behaved in a risky manner because of the absence of 
knowledge of a particular hazard in the operating procedures. 
 
4.5.1.4. Systemic factors identified with fit-for-purpose-equipment problems 
This section provides elucidation on systemic factors identified with situations of fit-for-purpose 
equipment problems identified in this study. 
 
 
Figure 31: Systemic factors identified with instances of fit-for-purpose equipment problems  
 
Figure 31 indicates that resource provision was the main reason for fit-for-purpose equipment. In 
most of these cases workers had no choice but to use available tools in order to accomplish the 
given task, because they were not provided with the right ones. The second most prevailing 
situation were scenarios in which leadership (mainly shift bosses and team leaders) did not report 
































capacity of the task to be accomplished. Maintenance management was identified as a significant 
contributory factor to issues of fit-for-purpose equipment in this study. The poor maintenance of 
existing equipment usually affected the ability of the tools to safely perform the respective task. 
Poor design, management of change and risk management each had minor contributions to the 
situations of fit-for-purpose equipment at the workplace. Examples of poor design of equipment 
identified in this study include equipment lacking handles and lack of protection against hazards 
while using equipment. Scenarios in which poor risk and change management were cited include 
situations where modifications on existing equipment/operation introduced new risks thereby 
leading to accidents and situations in which reported equipment deficiencies were not dealt with.  
 
4.5.1.5. Systemic factors identified with instances of unsafe work practices 
This section is aimed at providing the background information on the nature of systemic factors 
leading to unsafe work practices. 
The most common cause of unsafe work practices is hazard identification (see Figure 32). This 
usually led to hazards not being catered for in procedures, hence putting workers at risk while 
performing tasks. This condition, the author believes, created situations in which existing work 
procedures did not protect workers from hazards.  
 Management of change and monitoring and auditing were identified in a few instances as 
contributing to unsafe work practices. Management of change was identified as a contributing 
factor to unsafe work practices when an initially adequate procedure became inadequate due to 
changes in the usual work condition (example working in a new section). 
 Monitoring and auditing was also cited when the author had cause to believe that the unsafe 

















Figure 32: Systemic factors identified with instances of unsafe work practices 
` 
To conclude, the results obtained in this study have clearly been displayed and explained. 
Though there has been an initial discussion of the results, the next chapter focuses on the detailed 










































CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter focuses on the interpretation of the results presented in the previous chapter. The 
chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first section is concerned with the interpretation 
of the results obtained from the accident characterization. The aim of this exercise is to provide 
meaning to the type of results presented in Chapter Four and possible reasons why these results 
may be different from results obtained in other studies. The second section (5.2) analyses the 
different levels of accident causality and the implications for the broader organizational safety. 
Arguments for the conclusions presented in Chapter Six are also developed.   
 
5.1 Accident characterization 
The characterization of accidents provided the basis for understanding the other results obtained 
in this study. The results show that the mode of operation in the mine used as a case study 
exposes workers to hazards. This is because most tasks are very manual in nature. Figure 12 
showed that drilling and engineering tasks are the most accident prone tasks. These tasks are 
performed using hand held tools like drilling machines, crow bars and spanners which place 
them very close to the available hazards.  
This view on exposure to hazards is reiterated by the types of slipping and falling accidents 
identified in this study. Most slipping and falling accidents analysed in this study happened when 
the victim was walking, signifying limited protection from physical hazards. This supports the 
author‘s view that a significant number of the accidents are due to the proximity between hazards 
and workers.   
The level of exposure of humans to hazards in engineering tasks (e.g. maintenance) is somewhat 
the same across most industries. Reason (1997) stated that while some industries have been able 
to automate most functions, thereby moving workers further away from hazards, maintenance 
related activities remain one field where there still exists a significant level of contact between 
human and hazards. He argued that close contact between people and technical components 















An inference that can be drawn from this argument is that the activities at the mine under study 
which involve close contact between human, technological components of the system and 
hazards are partly responsible for the high involvement of human error in most accidents. This 
view is supported by results obtained in the barrier analysis section of this study (Figure 16) 
which showed that standards, risk assessment and supervision are the three barriers which were 
frequently breached.  It can be deduced from this that safety at the mine being investigated is 
heavily dependent on either the workers‘ willingness to obey rules, the supervisors‘ ability to 
enforce the rules, and the worker‘s ability to perceive danger in their environment and avoid it.  
This finding seems to support the suggestion made by Ashworth and Peake (1994) that current 
methods used in preventing fall of ground in underground mines in South Africa are inadequate, 
and that a technological solution aiding workers to determine whether or not a workplace is safe 
for operation is necessary. 
 However, the author also believes that mechanization and automation would not be a panacea to 
all the safety challenges faced in the South African mining industry. Reason (2000) described 
defence-in-depth (a desirable by-product of automation) as a mixed blessing. While defence-in-
depth ensures that a single failure on the part of a worker does not lead to accidents, it provides a 
means for the accumulation of individual failures up to the point where situations get out of 
hand. This makes proper safety management procedures the sure way to manage safety in a firm. 
In summary, the results from the accident characterization from this study have clearly shown 
the potential of the current work systems on the mine to serve as a precursor for many human 
induced accidents. The ext sections proceeds to discuss the pertinent human factor issues 
identified in these accidents.  
 
5.2 Accident causality 
The analysis of accident causality showed that violations were the most common unsafe acts. 
This can be compared to the earlier study on mine incidents by Patterson and Shappell (2010) in 
Australia, where skill based errors (slips and lapses) formed the bulk of the unsafe acts 
committed. The high number of violations identified in the current study relative to that of 















While the accident reports used in the current study were all from underground mines, the study 
of Patterson and Shappell (2010) used reports which had a balance of underground and open cut 
coal mines, underground and open cut metal/non-metal mines, quarries and preparation plants. 
Surface mining is usually mechanized, and preparation plants are mostly automated and this in a 
way helps to separate people from hazards. It is no wonder that the most common human errors 
encountered in Patterson and Shappell‘s (2010) study were inadvertent operations (slips and 
lapses).  
Most slips and lapses identified in this study were deemed to be caused by the presence of a non-
supporting physical environment. This is not really surprising considering the harsh 
environmental conditions to which workers are exposed. The effect of the physical environment 
on the performance of mine workers corroborates the studies of Sanmiquel et al (2010) and 
Patterson and Shappell (2010) which, although conducted in different countries (Spain and 
Australia respectively), identified the working environment as a major factor affecting the 
performance of mine workers. Although proper design could have improved the work 
environment in some incidents, most cases of physical environment were temporary situations 
created as operations were being carried out. This makes housekeeping, maintenance 
management, hazard identification, risk assessment and change management major issues to 
consider if the mining environment is to be made safer.    
The accident causality analysis also suggested that poor leadership is the root cause of most the 
violations identified in this study. This is based on the fact that the most common workplace 
factor identified with most violations was behavioural environment i.e. an environment where 
people that broke the standards or procedures were not corrected either by co-workers, team 
leaders or shift supervisors.  According to Reason et al (1998) this situation is due to the 
existence of conflicting goals. For instance, there can be a conflict between organizational goals 
in terms of rules and regulations (e.g. conducting mid-shift barring) and meeting a personal goal 
(e.g. achieving a production bonus). Ensuring that safe behaviour is psychologically rewarding is 
a viable option in addressing such a gross culture of impunity. Creating a social environment 
where wrong behaviour is eschewed and the concordance of individual and organizational goals 















environments. Based on the current study, it can be deduced that lapses in leadership/supervision 
are the root causes of violations.  
The author of the current study is of the opinion that high production pressures exerted on 
workers might have contributed to the high violation rates identified (note that this was not stated 
in any of the reports used in this study). One of the most common violations identified in this 
study is failure to do mid-shift barring. Workers were supposed to stop working and bar down 
any hanging or loose rocks. Workers are unlikely to conduct this barring operation if they are far 
behind completing the shift‘s work. In the analysis of the reports the current author came across 
instances of violations occurring in the presence of supervision. The fact that most of the 
violations identified in this study were routine or repetitive (see figure 17) also supports this 
view. This hints of the possibility of conflicting goals. This view is shared by Ashworth and 
Peake (1994) who conducted a separate research on the South African gold and platinum mining 
industry and the findings of an earlier study by Lenné et al (2011) which reported significant 
causal relationships betweem violations and adverse mental state. Adverse mental state as used 
in Lenné et al (2011) study describes situations of mental fatigue which may happen as a result 
of long hours of work.  
The author also believes that the causes of mistakes identified in this study are more complicated 
and diverse than the other unsafe acts. This view is influenced by the fact that the study 
identified that the causes of mistakes were distributed across the five workplace factors (Figure 
25). This seems to suggest that training is not a panacea to the liability of mistakes. The systemic 
factors leading to these workplace factors are also diverse as shown in figures 28 to 32 above. 
This situation may be due to the complex nature of mining hazards which make it difficult to 
predict exactly all possible scenarios of danger.  
 The most common mistakes identified in this study are poor communication amongst workers 
and poor risk/situational assessment. This is similar to the earlier findings of Patterson and 
Shappell (2010) and Ashworth and Peake (1994). The study of Patterson and Shappell (2010) 
identified procedural error, faulty risk and situational assessment as the most common decision 
errors (synonymous to mistakes). Ashworth and Peake (1994) also identified inadequate 
examination/inspection of the work environment as the cause of 21.4% of all accidents analysed. 















assessments by mine workers, which include inadequate methods of examination and the use of 
ineffective tools and inadequate training system. The study discovered that existing working 
procedures on barring are equivocal on how far to stand when barring rock or exactly what 
constitutes an unsafe environment. Tools used in barring, such as pinch bars, equally put 
workers in danger. This leads to the deduction that hazard identification, management of change, 
provision of resources and risk management are the systemic factors that need to be dealt with if 
mistakes leading to fall of ground are to be reduced.  
The study of Lenné et al (2011) identified technological environment (synonymous to fit-for-
purpose equipment) as the main cause of decision errors (mistakes). This tends to agree with 
findings of this study that the nature of the tools being used affect the quality of workers‘ 
judgement. Saleh and Cummings (2011) proposed the concept of defence-in-depth as a better 
way of dealing with hazards in mines. The merit and demerit of defence-in-depth have been 
discussed in Section 5.1. The author of this current study proposes the consideration of the use of 
technologies such as automation for making safe procedures (Teleka et al, 2012) and virtual 
reality training (Squelch, 2001; Etienne, 2008) to increase the level of safety against such 
complex hazards. 
The role of leadership/supervision (seen as contributing 51.6% of all accidents analysed) has 
been discussed in detail in this study due to the number of instances it was identified as a causal 
factor in various incidents. Leadership as used in this study involves shift bosses, team leaders 
and sectional supervisors. Due to the administrative nature of barriers used by the firm, the role 
of leadership in the safety of operations cannot be overemphasized. Different levels of leaders 
are in charge of operationalization of various components of safety managements such as 
provision of resources (making sure equipment moves from storage to workers), enforcing rules, 
conducting risk analysis on new tasks and ensuring safe housekeeping. It is no wonder that 
leadership was identified as a root cause of most workplace factors. The level of leadership 
lapses encountered in various incidents hints of deeper systemic problems. The author believes a 
further investigation of factors that affect the performance of leaders is needed.  
In conclusion, the study has clearly identified the complexity of accident causality. However the 
results suggest that most unsafe acts leading to accidents were actually influenced by workplace 















that with positive safety measures and a constant commitment to safety, a safer workplace can be 


































CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This section presents the conclusion of the entire study. Appropriate key findings, significance, 
limitation of study and recommendations are also reported. 
 
6.1 FINDINGS 
These are the key findings of this study: 
1. The nature of operations in the mine under study is such that humans are deeply involved 
in the daily operations, resulting in a high rate of human errors. 
2. There is a major difference between the type of human errors occurring in mechanized 
mining and labour intensive mining. 
3. Most of the violations identified are routine (repetitive). This seems to imply that there 
are some organizational factors (possibly production pressures) causing them. 
4. Leadership failure remains a major challenge in any attempt to improve safety at the 
mine.  
5. The existing measures used in dealing with mistakes at the mine are inadequate. Such 
mistakes are usually associated with fall of ground, use of hand tools and equipment. 
6. Most root causes of slips were temporarily environmental conditions created by work 
processes. 
7. A technique developed from the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason 1990, 1997) can be used 
to analyse incidents in the South African mining industry. 
 
6.2 SIGNIFICANCE  
1. A developed framework has been successfully used to analyse accidents from a platinum 
mine South Africa. This has led to the identification of factors which are of importance to 
the safety of the industry.  
2. The results have been compared with other studies carried out for mines in other 
countries (Lenné et al, 2011; Sanmiquel et al, 2010; Patterson and Shappell, 2010) and in 
South Africa (Ashworth and Peake, 1994). Significant similarities and differences have 















3. A foundation has been laid for the use of larger data set for a cross commodity (different 
type of mines and products) analysis. This will bring to light the broader picture of the 
systemic factors to be considered.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS  
1. As with all post-hoc analysis, the efficacy of the technique depends on the genuineness of 
the information in the accident reports. The author has no other means of cross checking 
such information. 
2. The author also acknowledges the challenges that come with interpreting the results from 
a study using accident reports from just one company. However this is not seen as a 
major problem since the aim of the study was to demonstrate how a tool can be applied 
rather than providing factual statements about the South African mining industry. 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. The author of this current study recommends that the developed framework be tested 
with data from other mining commodities, most importantly the gold and the coal 
industries. These two industries are cited because of their contributions to annual 
fatalities.  
2. The author also recommends that a survey be conducted amongst various kinds of 
leadership at the mines. This recommendation stems from the fact that most violations 
occurred either in the presence of supervisors or as a result of inadequate supervision. 
Since most safeguards against hazards depend on the enforcement by leaders and 




































Experience Job Title 
 
1 13:30 Installing 
Underground 
Contractor 







52 3 Artisan 
 
3 10:08 Make Safe 
Underground 
Employee 
33 10 Artisan 
 
4 21:40 Drilling 
Underground 
Employee 
























Table B 1: Agency and Barrier analysis section 




1 The cheesa was walking in the center 
raise when a fog occurred during the 
installation of hydrabolts and rocks 
struck him on his skull, neck. 
Fall of ground Fatal Supervision Supervisors ordering 
wrong person to 
conduct inspection 
2 Victim was struck by an LHD whiles 
sitting against the sidewall in roadway 
Machinery Serious injury SOP SOP not obeyed 
3 Barring the chute at silo no.2 when the 
rocks dislodge and struck the pinch bar 
which tilted upwards and struck him on 








implying poor job 
hazard analysis. 
Supervisor fails in his 
duties 
4 Drilling the face when a piece of rock 
that has dislodge, rolled and struck him 




Serious injury Supervision Supervisor failed in 
his duties did not 
























Table C 1: The Causal Section 










cause Comment on choice 
1 
0 0 0 0 1 
He was working under an unsafe 
ground 
1 
0 0 1 0 0 
He was not qualified by standards to 
do the rock inspection 
2 
0 0 1 0 0 






He didn't hear/see the LHD coming, he 
might have fallen asleep 
3 
0 1 0 0 0 Wrong positioning for the job 
4 
1 0 0 0 0 
Stone that fell was obscured due to 
thickness of rock 
4 
0 0 1 0 0 
Mid shift barring not done, it may 
have identified rock 
5 
0 0 1 0 0 
 Instead of using equipment for mid-
shift barring he used his hand(Risky 



























cause CP FFPE PE BE UWP Comment 
1 Non-human 
cause 0 0 1 0 0 Adverse ground condition  
1 Routine 
violation 0 0 0 1 0 Chief rock engineer flouted the rules, 
2 Slip and 
lapses 1 0 0 0 0 
He was on medication, not fit for such 
task 
2 Routine 
violation 0 0 1 0 0 
Sat at the unsanctioned place because 
the designated place was very dirty 
2 
Mistake 0 0 1 0 0 No sign indicating the danger  
3 
Mistake 0 1 0 0 0 Using short pinch so he had to climb up 
3 
Mistake 0 0 1 0 0 Box design was limiting 
3 
Mistake 1 0 0 0 0 training didn't fully prepare him for that 
3 
Mistake 0 0 0 0 1 
Existing standards weren't enough to 







CP = Competent people. FFPE= Fit-for-purpose equipment, BE = Behavioural environment, 















Table C 3: The Causal section (Systemic Factors) 
                                                             Systemic Factors 








1 Physical environment 
R.M. 0 Adverse ground condition not managed properly 
1 Behavioural environment 
C.M. L 
Supervisor ordered the violation, it was because of inadequate 
stuff resulting from exodus of workers 
2 Physical environment 
H.K. 0 Poor housekeeping, cubicle has not been cleaned for a while 
2 Competent people 
C.M. 0 A medically unfit contractor working  
3 FFP equipment 
P.R. 0 Failure to provide workers with long pinch bars 
3 Physical environment 
D 0 Poor design of work environment 
3 people 
T.C. L 
Existence training inadequate, Failure by supervisor to 
conduct Planned task observation 
3 Unsafe work practices 
H.I. MC 
Existing standards weren't enough to identify all the risks. 





R.M. = risk management, C.M. Change management, L = leadership, HK=housekeeping, P.R. = Provision of Resources, 
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